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Abstract 
This paper investigates the variations in public mood pertaining to climate skepticism and attempts to 
empirically assess whether economic recessions or partisanship help explain aggregate-level trends and 
movements across a 16-year time horizon. Public survey data from the iPoll and Gallup Organization were 
used to construct the Climate Change Skeptic Index (CCSI) that served as a proxy to capture public 
opinion trends in skepticism across the U.S. A two-part vector autoregressive model suggests that while 
economic recessions might be causally linked to climate skepticism, partisanship plays a more influential 
role in explaining it over time. The key result is that holding all included variables constant, anti-climate 
change statements by Republican Congresspersons made three quarters ago raise the CCSI by 0.17 
percentage points on average in the current quarter. 
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In 2006, U.S. District Judge Gladys Kessler took a year to produce a monumental, 1,652-
page opinion piece. This opinion detailed the highly sophisticated strategies used by tobacco 
companies to deny the science behind the harmful effects of smoking. Agnotology is the 
study of culturally induced doubt or ignorance, particularly through the publication of 
misleading scientific data. Similar to the strategies used by the tobacco industry, the 
evolution of climate skepticism provides an intriguing example of agnotology. Over the past 
two decades, the phenomenon of climate skepticism represents the massive gap between the 
scientific community’s consensus view on climate change and the U.S. public’s divided 
opinion on climate change.  
 Discussions of public opinions on socio-economic, political, or other stimulating 
topics are usually heralded from three types of sources: a perspective that agrees with or 
argues for the subject in discussion, a perspective that disagrees with or argues against the 
subject, and a neutral perspective that assumes the unbiased stance. One way to contextualize 
climate skepticism at an aggregate level is by categorizing and summarizing American public 
opinions on climate change. This method assumes that there is such a thing as a “public 
mood” on climate skepticism that isn’t static but can be dynamically influenced by other 
factors over time. Contemporary research in Political Science usually tends to focus on the 
effects of the American public’s partisan values on climate skepticism while controlling for 
other factors. The dominating influence of partisanship to explain climate skepticism is so 
strongly backed that researchers have even tested it as a “moderating variable” to learn if it 
could overwhelm other explanatory factors (Egan & Mullin 2016, 216). Studies by Malka 
(2009), McCright & Dunlap (2011), Guber (2013), and Hamilton (2015) have shown that 
informational factors such as education, self-rated knowledge, and science comprehension are 
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positively related to climate belief for Democrats (and liberals) and vice-versa for 
Republicans (and conservatives). Despite the plethora of research focused on partisanship, 
others have argued that economic recessions provide a unique, alternative perspective to 
understand climate skepticism. Scruggs and Benegal (2012) find convincing evidence that the 
onset of the Great Recession in 2008 was an important contributing factor to explain public 
opinion trends on skepticism. My curiosity to understand the influencers of climate 
skepticism and the debate between its prevailing explanatory factor, partisanship, and niche 
explanatory factor, recessions, sets up the key research question for this thesis. 
 An empirical research thesis can choose to go any number of ways to conceptualize 
the relationships between climate skepticism and the two key explanatory factors. I chose a 
multivariate timeseries method called vector autoregression analysis to unearth these 
interrelationships and find an answer to the research question: “Recessions or Partisanship: 
What explains climate skepticism in the U.S.?” Data for the explanatory variables is 
relatively easy to find with help from past research and well-developed institutional platforms 
like the FRED Economic Data. Computing aggregate-level climate skepticism is a bit more 
challenging and is constructed using a novel strategy with inspiration from Brulle et al. 
(2012) and the aid of the Dyad Ratios algorithm. I also used existing literature and made a 
few subjective decisions on what variables best represent economic recessions and 
partisanship. For recessions, I used variables that are often espoused in research and media to 
capture the declining state of the economy. For partisanship, I focused on “political elite 
cues” similar to Brulle et al. (2012) to understand how statements and voting patterns of 
Democratic and Republican Congresspersons could shift public opinion on climate change. 
Through the empirical analysis, I find that the effects of economic recessions on climate 
skepticism are not clearly discernible for the target period (2000 – 2015). The causality tests 
introduced later in the paper indicate that recessionary factors might be causally linked to 
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skepticism, but do not provide enough evidence to make definitive claims without further 
explication and analysis. In terms of partisanship, Republican (Congressperson) statements 
and voting patterns supply consistent evidence to suggest causality and explain the variance 
in climate skepticism. Democratic (Congressperson) statements aren’t significant at 
explaining trends in skepticism but their voting patterns demonstrate causal effects 
systematically and the regression model contributes to explaining the variance in climate 
skepticism. 
 The focus of this empirical thesis is to find an answer to the research question. But 
along the way, I’ve attempted to replicate and intuitively understand some of the 
sophisticated algorithms and data generating processes to justify using these techniques. 
These sections, that serve as a quasi-knowledgebase to demonstrate my learning and 
reference for curious readers, are Section 3 and Section 4.1 in the table of contents and can be 
skipped by readers only interested in the empirical analysis. The remainder of my paper is 
arranged as follows. Section 2 is a Literature Review of other research pertaining to climate 
skepticism. Section 3 contains the Methodology Theory that discusses the construction of the 
Climate Change Skeptic Index. Section 4 is the heart of the thesis comprising of the 
Empirical Strategy that is further broken down into (4.1) DGP Overview that describes the 
CCSI and replicates the vector autoregression, (4.2) Applying the Model to the CCSI which 
provides descriptive statistics and defines the key hypothesis tests, and (4.3) Data Analysis 
that highlights and interprets the empirical results. Section 5 consists of Conclusion, that 
summarizes my answer to the research question and explores further avenues for research, 










 The business of doubt is not a contemporary issue. Humans have repeatedly used it to 
derive economic value and psychological pleasure in the markets and political economy. In 
fact, at a micro-level, good parenting involves introducing healthy skepticism into a child’s 
mind and institutions of higher education often proclaim their ability to develop contrarians. 
Nevertheless, a phenomenon with the scope to create economic value comes with innate 
accountability and responsibility to its stakeholders. Big tobacco indulged in such a business 
of doubt in the late 1990s and found itself at the brink of collapse when their deceiving 
business model was eventually trumped by overwhelming scientific evidence. Similarly, 
individuals and stakeholders that witnessed the impending trade-offs mandated by climate 
change research in the 1990s, sought to pull out the same stops (sometimes, incredulously, 
using the same lawyers as the tobacco industry) and inject doubt in the public’s mind. Powell 
(2011) asserts that this “anatomy of denial” isn’t novel and humans have used such 
“rhetorical devices” since the time of the Greeks (Powell 2011, 170). One of the fifteen 
methods described by Powell (2011) pertains to this idea of “manufacturing doubt” in the 
common person. Equating climate denial to a civil trial, Powell states that “a defense attorney 
(climate denier) has to prove nothing – only sow enough doubt to weaken the prosecution’s 
(climate scientist) case” (Powell 2011, 127).  
 The scientific evidence for climate change is plentiful and the potential long-term 
risks are well-documented. A sweeping threat like climate change is tough to ignore and 
finding effective and sustainable solutions should have become the norm since the famous 
Charney report, “Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment”, caught the 
attention of top government officials, scientists, business professionals, and the public in 
1979. Contrary to this expectation, global warming and climate change emerged as 
controversial economic and contentious political issues creating a deep divide about climate 
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science amongst the American public. Egan and Mullin (2017) observes this divide 
statistically and states: “by 1997, concern (about global warming) had dropped sharply 
among Republicans compared to Democrats, the beginning of a gap between partisans that 
has widened over time and currently stands at more than 40 percentage points” (Egan & 
Mullin 2017, 217). McCright and Dunlap (2011) provides groundbreaking insights on the rise 
of partisanship and the subsequent polarization of climate change. They explain the growing 
polarization problem within climate change with the “party sorting” theory. The key idea 
propagated by the theory involves developing friction among party elites on a controversial 
issue which results in “party sorting”, i.e. dividing the public and driving them to assume 
conflicting positions. McCright and Dunlap (2011) test this theory by using an empirical 
strategy comprising of a multivariate logistic regression model to examine Gallup polling 
data on climate change opinion from 2001 to 2010 for evidence on three distinct areas: the 
political divide on global warming beliefs and concern, the moderating effect of political 
orientation, and ideological and partisan polarization. Positioning political ideology and party 
identification as explanatory variables and controlling for demographics, temperature and 
nine other variables, McCright and Dunlap (2011) finds statistically significant and positive 
results to support their hypotheses that “self-identified liberals and Democrats are more likely 
to report beliefs about climate science consistent with the scientific consensus (hypothesis 1) 
and express personal concern about global warming (hypothesis 2)” (McCright & Dunlap 
2011, 170). Furthermore, to study the moderating effect of political orientation, McCright and 
Dunlap (2011) utilizes interaction terms that combine party identification and ideology with 
educational attainment to verify the results of previous studies on this subject. The analysis is 
consistent with the theory once again as McCright and Dunlap (2011) asserts that “the effects 
of educational attainment and self-reported understanding on beliefs about climate science 
and personal concern about global warming are positive for liberals and Democrats, but are 
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weaker or negative for conservatives and Republicans” (McCright & Dunlap 2011, 175). The 
concluding part of their analysis is dedicated to answering the question: “Has the polarization 
and ideological divide on climate change, tested in the previous hypotheses, grown larger 
among the public?”. McCright and Dunlap (2011) relies on another interaction effect, this 
time between “political orientation x year” to gather insights on this question (175). The 
regression model used to test this specification finds a statistically significant result and 
McCright and Dunlap (2011) emphasizes that the polarization trend has grown consistently 
over time and state that differences in global warming belief diverged from an 18-point 
difference in 2001 to a 44-point difference in 2010 between liberals and conservatives.  
 The influence of partisan differences on climate change is not a problem unique to the 
US as a “meta-analysis of 25 polls and 171 studies in 156 countries showed that aligning with 
conservative party ideology consistently predicted climate change skepticism across political 
settings” (Egan & Mullin 2017, 216). But, since 1997, the consistently widening gap of 
climate change opinions between partisan groups in the US has provided researchers with an 
interesting phenomenon to consider. Brulle (2013) asserts a strong correlation between 
targeted foundation funding to proliferate climate skepticism. Furthermore, these 
conservative think tanks, trade associations, and foundations that form a part of the larger 
“climate change counter-movement (CCCM)” are used by Brulle (2013) in the final analysis 
that results in “140 foundations making 5,299 grants totalling $558 million to 91 (CCCM) 
organizations” over a period of 7 years from 2003-2010 (Brulle 2013, 684). Predominantly, 
media coverage and academic literature of the CCCM has been limited to a few key 
organizations and simplistic discussion of their activities. On the contrary, Brulle (2013) 
approaches this issue holistically and following a comprehensive definition of the climate 
change counter-movement, considers questions like, “How are these organizations financially 
maintained?” and “How do these organizations and their funders interact to form a social 
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movement?” (Brulle 2013, 682). Sticking essentially to a consistent technique of ‘following 
the money’, Brulle (2013) uncovers several big CCCM donors such as the Donors Trust 
($78.8 million) and Scaife Affiliated Foundations ($39.6 million) and recipients of these 
CCCM funds including well-known conservative think tanks like the American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research ($86.7 million) and Heritage Foundation ($76.4 million). 
Another interesting link is implied when Brulle (2013) highlights that the rise of Donors 
Trust/Capital and the subsequent decline of ExxonMobil and Koch coincides with targeted 
environmental campaigns criticizing Koch and Exxon by the Union of Concerned Scientists 
and Greenpeace. Literature on the climate change counter-movement is not scarce and 
researchers have deployed varying methods to study this occurrence. Jacques and Dunlap 
(2008) provides another fascinating approach by performing a quantitative analysis of the 
link between conservative think tanks (CTTs) and environmental skepticism. The analysis 
involves “141 environmentally skeptic books published between 1972 and 2005” and were 
chosen if they “denied or downplayed the seriousness of problems such as climate change” 
and eight other categories of environmental issues (Jacques et al., 2008, 358). On the other 
end of this analysis, CTTs were identified with the help of the Heritage Foundation’s web 
portal that stores a database of other CTTs espousing similar conservative values and were 
filtered by using specific keywords to extract the ones focused on environmental issues and 
policy. Their findings show that of the 141 chosen books, “130 books (92.2%) have a clear 
link one or more CTTs – either via author affiliation (62 books) or because the book was 
published by a CTT (5 books) or both (63 books)” (Jacques et al., 2008, 360). Finally, they 
scan 50 CTT websites and find that 45 (90%) of them espouse environmentally skeptic 
values.  
  Academic research pertaining to climate skepticism might be disproportionately 
focused towards the politicization and partisan themes involved in this matter, but alternate 
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theories suggest economic factors could have a substantial say in influencing public opinion 
on climate change. Scruggs and Benegal (2012) argues that the impact of the great recession 
on public opinion of climate change may have been overlooked; a quick glance at nationally 
recognized survey polls from Gallup and Pew indicate that agreement over whether there is 
“solid evidence of warming” declined from 77% in 2007 to 57% in October 2009 (Scruggs 
and Benegal, 2012, 2). Scruggs and Benegal (2012) attempts an aggregate level and an 
individual level analysis of public survey responses to examine the influence of weather, 
media, and economic indicators on climate skepticism. For the aggregate level analysis, 
survey responses from Pew, Gallup, and Stanford are pooled together as a proxy to measure 
public opinion and an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model is fitted to observe the 
influencers of climate skepticism. The aggregate level analysis showed evidence that weather 
and economic indicators, specifically unemployment rate, had a greater impact on public 
support for climate change than the media. Scruggs and Benegal (2012) finds that a 2.1 point 
increase in unemployment rate leads to a 4-percentage point decline in public support for 
climate while holding weather, media, and the consumer confidence index constant. The 
individual level analysis utilizes a binary response variable to gather evidence on the 
question: “Is there solid evidence that the Earth is warming?”. The authors decide that a 
logistic regression model is a better estimator than an OLS with a binary response variable 
and include various demographic controls in the model. This model gathers insights on the 
extent of partisan influence and states that while climate change belief rates are lower for 
Republicans and fell from 60% in 2006 to 38% in 2010, the climate change belief rates didn’t 
fare much better for Democrats during the same period and fell by 10 percent from 90%. 
Scruggs and Benegal (2012) attempts to raise the importance of an economic crisis and bring 
it amidst the climate change conversation without side-lining or ignoring the impact of 
partisanship, weather, media, and misinformation campaigns. Finally, further research and 
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similar regression analyses on European countries show that public opinion of climate change 
in countries with low partisan differences can still be negatively impacted due to economic 
indicators.  
 Scruggs and Benegal (2012) shows that an aggregate level analysis of climate 
skepticism is possible, and researchers can empirically assess the societal mood towards the 
issue in a chosen year. Brulle et al. (2012) considers a longer time horizon to assess the 
changes in public mood on climate change. Here the authors build a “Climate Change Threat 
Index (CCTI)” to develop a macro-level measure of the American public’s consensus on the 
threat attributed by climate change to their lives. Brulle et al. (2012) tests seven model 
specifications using a vector autoregression model (VAR) to assess their influence on the 
CCTI. The variables used to estimate the VAR fall into six broad categories: extreme weather 
events, scientific information, mass media coverage, media advocacy, political elite cues, and 
economic controls. Their research finds that public statements in support of climate change 
by Democrats, positive trends in GDP, and New York Times mentions of An Inconvenient 
Truth are the three strongest positive predictors of change in the CCTI. On the other hand, the 
level of anti-environmental Republican voting patterns and the unemployment level are the 
strongest negative predictors of changes in the CCTI (Brulle et al., 2012, 14). In the next 
section, I’ll explore various empirical methods available to researchers interested in 
estimating and analyzing the aggregate level opinion trends on climate skepticism and 









 In the literature review, we discussed different individual and aggregate level 
approaches to gather insights on climate skepticism in the US. Since this paper attempts to 
discern and find empirical results to answer the key question of whether recessions or 
partisanship influence the U.S. public mood on climate skepticism, an aggregate level model 
inspired by the approach used in Brulle et al. (2012) is the effective way moving forward. An 
individual level analysis isn’t helpful since the data sample in such a technique pertains to 
individual respondents and hence does not facilitate specific observations related to the causal 
effects between macroeconomic factors and the skeptic attitudes of the US public. Scruggs 
and Benegal (2012) shows us results from both an aggregate-level approach and an 
individual-level analysis. The key difference in this instance pertains to the nature of results 
obtained as the aggregate-level approach allows the researcher to present a generalized 
argument on how media, weather, and economic conditions influence public opinion about 
global warming. On the other hand, the individual-level survey analysis provides empirical 
answers that allow researchers to make specific arguments on how the race, party affiliation, 
education, income and other key demographics affect an individual’s likelihood of 
responding positively or negatively to the global warming question. Hence, an aggregate-
level analysis channels the focus of an empirical study to consensus estimates that provide a 
framework to critically answer macro-level questions about climate skepticism in the US.   
 Though the aggregate-level approach is determined as the best way to proceed, the 
researcher now has several options to build a narrative that connects their theoretical claims 
to an empirical result. The main obstacle involves finding a consistent and reliable measure to 
define the climate skeptic attitudes and capture the altering public opinion trends. A potential 
source for such a measure comes from public polling institutions that have collected data on 
climate change for many years. Since their target audience (the public, politicians, journalists, 
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etc.) usually cares about trending topics and stats of a shorter time horizon, most of the 
questions posed through these polls do not repeat and lack consistent question wording over 
time. Furthermore, there is considerable disagreement over whether the differences between a 
climate change ‘skeptic’ and a climate change ‘denier’ are significant. For this thesis, I’ve 
combined them and avoided differentiating between these sub-groups. Herein I run into the 
classic aggregation problem, a problem on how to obtain a proxy that best represents climate 
skepticism across the US without excluding relevant polling results and including irrelevant 
survey questions.       
❖ What is the best proxy for climate skepticism in the US? 
The rationale behind the shorter time horizon of most survey questions conducted by polling 
institutions was mentioned earlier. This is a pertinent problem because independent factors 
that could influence climate skepticism need to be analysed over time and contribute little if 
looked at through a cross-sectional study. For instance, a key agenda of the paper is to 
determine whether economic recessions are causally linked to heightened climate skepticism. 
To include a time period with at least two recessionary periods, the proxy needs to capture a 
full decade from early 2000s (the dot-com crash) to 2010 (which includes the financial crisis 
of 2008). In short, we are looking for a proxy that captures the level of climate skepticism by 
aggregating information from relevant survey questions spanning the two recessions of 2001 
and 2008. 
Simple or Weighted Average: The mean is perhaps the most common measure of center used 
in aggregation problems. Barreto and Howland (2006) highlights the pertinence of using the 
average as a linear estimator and states that when the “data generating process follows the 
classical econometric model (CEM), then the sample average is the best linear, unbiased 
estimator” (Barreto & Howland 2006, 346). This theorem, known commonly as the Gauss-
Markov theorem, fails to validate the usage of the average for my purposes because the 
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sampling process and the climate change polling questions do not fulfil the requirements of 
the CEM. Among several requirements of the CEM, a key one states that the error terms in 
the model are distributed independent and identical to one another. Since the chosen method 
involves a time-series analysis, this requirement for the error terms may not hold true and the 
conditions of a CEM are violated. The average may not qualify as the best unbiased estimator 
for my purported model due to discrepancies to the Gauss-Markov theorem, but I can still use 
it as a comparative measure to test the robustness of other unbiased estimators. The weighted 
average holds a slight advantage over the simple average in this model since it will 
proportionately assign weights to survey responses with larger sample sizes instead of 
treating them equally. The advantage arises because larger sample sizes result in smaller 
standard errors. But, the average runs into problems and becomes less reliable as an estimator 
when missing questions enter the time series model. The missing questions problem arises 
because most polling institutions ask questions based on issues that are of current importance 
and either change the wording of the question or discontinue the questions over subsequent 
periods. Even the same question is not asked every single year. For example, Gallup Polls 
posed the question: “Is the seriousness of global warming generally exaggerated, generally 
correct, generally underestimated?” in the years: 2000, 2004, 2010, 2013, 2015. Now, if the 
chosen timeline for the model extends from 2000 to 2015, the variable representing this 
question in the time series will have 10 missing values in its respective matrix. This example 
is not an exception as most survey questions measuring skepticism face a similar issue. The 
average struggles to perform consistently with missing values and hence might not be the best 
proxy for capturing the macro-level estimate of climate skepticism in the US. 
Dyad Ratios Method: Stimson (2017) recognizes this shortcoming in using the average as an 
estimator of underlying mood based on survey data and proposes the dyad ratios algorithm as 
an alternative solution to better estimate the “latent structure” underlying a given dataset 
13
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(Stimson 2017, 5). The dyad ratios algorithm deals with the missing values dilemma in a 
creative way that involves building “dyads”, where all the survey results in a given timeseries 
are transformed into ratios reliant on other existing values and the resulting matrix is used to 
capture the latent structure of the dataset through a recursive estimation technique. The next 
section dives deeper into the dyad ratios algorithm and compares its timeseries output of the 
polling data used in this paper to the simple and weighted averages. Furthermore, I will 
briefly review the Item Response Theory alternative to the Dyad Ratios method and critically 



















Stimson’s Dyad Ratios Algorithm 
 At the onset of this paper, the psychology and prevalence of climate skepticism is 
discussed extensively leading to a theoretical case for the creation of an aggregate-level 
measure that captures the underlying public mood. The concept of public mood isn’t abstract, 
researchers have used it time and again to create generalized dispositions of public opinion to 
predict the changes in their theorized model through external shocks. To clarify, phenomena 
like climate skepticism might have specific factors predicting outcomes in any given 
situation. But there is a subset of unknown, generic factors that underpin the public mood or 
latent structure of such issues. For instance, Brulle (2013) mentions the contributions of 
conservative think tanks and institutions to fund the counter climate change movement that is 
directly targeted at influencing climate skepticism in the US. On the other hand, the 
occurrence of an economic downturn is a general trend of a boom-and-bust economic cycle 
but may still instigate climate skepticism even if it isn’t purported to influence the public 
mood on climate change.  
❖ Why was the Dyad Ratios Algorithm created? 
On the issue of estimating public mood, another estimation technique often used is called the 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA). It is a statistical tool used to compress a large 
variable set to a small set while preserving most of the original information. A mathematical 
procedure, using a square symmetric matrix, is conducted to transform a range of potentially 
correlated variables into a subset of uncorrelated variables which gives the analysis its name 
of principal components. But PCA is unreliable in estimating public mood on issues like 
climate skepticism because it requires a completed matrix for the mathematical procedure to 
work and create a consistent estimation. There is an abundance of data through public polls 
on climate skepticism, but the pain point arises due to the irregularity and inconsistency of 
the polls resulting in an incomplete matrix. The Dyad Ratios Algorithm was created as an 
Back to Contents 
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alternative to the PCA and contends as a data extraction technique that can estimate a latent 
structure while attempting to gauge public opinion based on irregular survey data. Next, I 
take a detailed look at the logic of the dyad ratios algorithm by walking through the key steps 
of building dyads, implementing the recursive estimation procedure, using an iterative 
process for validity estimation and rounding it off with the bootstrapping of standard errors. 
Finally, this section will conclude with a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of 
this approach and a quick glance at the Item Response Theory alternative proposed by 
McGann (2014).  
❖ How does the Dyad Ratios algorithm work? 
 
The algorithm begins with an assertion that changes in survey marginals from one period to 
the next indicates changes in the underlying public mood, assuming the chosen survey 
adequately captures the mood. In the case of climate skepticism, we have several reliable 
survey questions that have been administered by different polling institutions over time. A 
rigorous selection process gives us a subset of questions that can potentially capture the 
variance of public mood on climate skepticism on a time series. A crucial observation is the 
entry of missing survey marginals for questions that are either discontinued or modified over 
subsequent periods. To begin the construction of the Dyad Ratios algorithm, I have a subset 
of irregular questions that can estimate the latent structure, i.e. climate skepticism, over a 
chosen period. Next, I explore the implementation of dyads and lay out the foundation of the 
algorithm.  
A) Dyad Ratios and Matrix Formation: To simplify the dyad ratios creation, the algorithm 
necessitates that all survey marginals are scored in the same direction, i.e. a higher number 
indicates a greater indication of the latent structure and vice-versa (Stimson 2017, 8). The 
ideal way to clarify the complexities of the dyad ratios algorithm is to create a small example 
16




that helps us understand the logic and various moving parts. The small example can be 
followed along using the “SmallExample-4x4.xls” file. In Figure 1.1, I have a 4x3 complete 
matrix with hypothetical survey question items xi, xj, and xk that are administered in Time (T) 
1 to 4. Starting with a complete matrix will help understand the dyad ratios estimation 
technique when missing values enter the 
equation.    
A dyad can be defined as the value 
obtained from a ratio of a given item over 
any two time points. Stimson (2017) argues 
that using dyads to make relative comparisons among survey marginals of different question 
items has two advantages. First, the missing values scenario doesn’t impact the usefulness of 
the dyads as they are relative measures built using known values of the item. Secondly, with 
missing values, descriptive statistics of variables like the mean become unreliable. But, the 
expected value for dyads of a given item across multiple periods is equal to 1 and this 
improves the consistency of the data used to estimate the latent structure. This relative nature 
of dyads results in an exponential growth every time a new question item or a time period is 
added to the matrix. Moreover, the recursive estimation technique of the algorithm uses 
forward and backward recursion that employs a given item’s value at each time period twice 
(excluding the first and last values in the timeseries), the numerator and the denominator 
positions of the dyad ratio. Using the 4x3 example matrix, a deeper look into the recursive 
estimation process will clarify the ideas discussed above, provide a side-by-side comparison 
to contextualize the “best proxy of climate skepticism” debate in the previous section, and 
reveal why dyad ratios provide a better estimate of the latent structure than a simple average.  
Complete  Matrix
Time xi xj xk
1 30 40 50
2 40 50 60
3 45 55 65
4 50 60 70
Question Items 
Figure 1.1: Complete Matrix  
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B) Recursive Estimation: As discussed, the 4x3 matrix results in multiple combinations of 
dyads and Figure 1.2 illustrates all the potential ratio combinations using the forward and 
backward recursion processes for the items xi, xj, and xk.  
 
To understand the logic of the dyads, let’s walkthrough a slightly altered matrix which 
includes missing values and is a better representation of real survey samples. Consider the 
following incomplete matrix in Figure 1.3 below. There are 3 missing values, one for each 
item across different time periods. To 
reiterate, the recursive estimation process is 
a better solution to combine information 
across time than an average when missing 
values are involved.  
Backward Recursion Process:  
1. To build the dyad ratios using backward recursion, the first step involves starting at the 
final period (T4, in this case) for an item, xi for instance, and building ratios relative to T4 
for xi at all preceding time periods (T3, T2, & T1). Next, we further this process by 
Forward recursion
xi2 / xi1 1.33 1.13 xi3 / xi2
xi3 / xi1 1.50 1.25 xi4 / xi2
xi4 / xi1 1.67 1.11 xi4 / xi3
xj2 / xj1 1.25 1.10 xj3 / xj2
xj3 / xj1 1.38 1.20 xj4 / xj2
xj4 / xj1 1.50 1.09 xj4 / xj3
xk2 / xk1 1.20 1.08 xk3 / xk2
xk3 / xk1 1.30 1.17 xk4 / xk2





xi1/xi4 0.60 0.75 xi1/xi2
xi2/xi4 0.80 0.67 xi1/xi3
xi3/xi4 0.90 0.89 xi2/xi3
xj1/xj4 0.67 0.80 xj1/xj2
xj2/xj4 0.83 0.73 xj1/xj3
xj3/xj4 0.92 0.91 xj2/xj3
xk1/xk4 0.71 0.83 xk1/xk2
xk2/xk4 0.86 0.77 xk1/xk3




Figure 1.2: Forward and Backward Recursion Dyads for Complete Matrix 
Incomplete Matrix




4 50 60 70
Questions Items 
Figure 1.3: Incomplete Matrix 
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moving one time period backwards ([T4]-1 = T3) and building ratios relative to T3 for xi 
at all preceding time periods (T2 & T1). This process is repeated until we reach the first 
time period (T1) and there are no preceding time periods with item values in the dataset. 
Illustration 1 below is a visual description of this dyad creation process for the backward 
recursion process. This gives a subset of ratios from the incomplete matrix which looks 
similar to the backward recursion table in Figure 2, but now I have 3 missing dyad values 
for each item induced by the missing values in the incomplete matrix. The backward 
recursion table in Figure 1.4 illustrates the dyads that will be used to complete the rest of 
the recursive estimation process.  
 
(Step 1)




4 50 60 70
Questions Items 
(Step 2)




4 50 60 70
Questions Items 
(Step 3)




4 50 60 70
Questions Items 
Illustration 1: Backward Recursion Dyads Walkthrough 




Dyads created - Step 2
xi1/xi3 -
xi2/xi3 -
Dyads created - Step 3
xi1/xi2 0.75
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2. To estimate the latent structure at each time period, I consider an arbitrary value of 100 
for the final period T4 in our dataset. This is done while computing ratios in the previous 
step since I had no available information to equate the value of any item to a respective 
value in a time period after T4. Thus, I was only able to use that final time period (T4) in 
the denominator of the computed ratios, i.e. as a relative measure for other item values. 
Continuing the backward recursion, the next step is to estimate CT-1, the latent structure at 
the penultimate period, which is T3 or the T4 – 1 period by using the absolute values for 
all items with existing values in T3 and in turn, existing dyad ratios for the T3 / T4 
periods. A quick glance at the incomplete matrix in Figure 1.3 shows that only items xj 
and xk have existing values for T3. Hence, CT-1 is estimated by averaging the dyad ratios 
for all existing item values with T3 / T4 dyads and projecting it based on the final period 
(T4) that was assigned the arbitrary value of 100. The calculation of CT-1 is shown in 
Figure 1.5, where I obtain the “Avg T4-3” value by averaging the dyads “xj3/xj4” and 
“xk3/xk4” and multiply this average with the arbitrary value of 100 to obtain CT-1. At the 
Forward recursion
xi2 / xi1 1.33333 xi3 / xi2
xi3 / xi1 1.25 xi4 / xi2
xi4 / xi1 1.66667 xi4 / xi3
xj2 / xj1 xj3 / xj2
xj3 / xj1 1.375 xj4 / xj2
xj4 / xj1 1.5 1.09091 xj4 / xj3
xk2 / xk1 1.08333 xk3 / xk2
xk3 / xk1 1.16667 xk4 / xk2

















Figure 1.4: Forward and Backward Recursion Dyads for Incomplete Matrix 
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end of this step, I have two values estimating the latent structure, CT which is the arbitrary 
value of 100 and CT-1 which is the “data determined value reflecting the true ratio of T 
(T4) and T-1 (T3) estimated from all of the existing data” (Stimson 2017, 11). This step is 
crucial and justifies the claim that dyad ratios uses only existing values of items and 
restricts the missing values from affecting the latent structure estimation.   
3. The process in Step 2 is extended and repeated until I have latent structure estimates for 
the remaining time periods. In the example, this involves estimating CT-3 and CT-2 to 
conclude the backward recursion process. While the averaging process of the ratios is the 
same as stated in Step 2, the only difference is that instead of T3 / T4 dyads I am using all 
existing items with T2 / T3 dyads and projecting CT-2 by using the data determined value 
of CT-1 instead of the arbitrary value of 100 chosen for CT. Steps 2 and 3 are repeated until 
the backward recursive process hits the first period in the dataset. A final step to finish 
this process is to measure the percentage change in the latent structure C from one period 
to the next as shown in the “Latent C (% change)” column in Figure 1.5. This is done to 
transform the latent C obtained by the dyad ratios algorithm into a comparable form to the 





xi1/xi4 0.60 0.75 xi1/xi2 Avg T4-1 0.633 0.750 Avg T2-1 1 63.874 33.3%
xi2/xi4 0.80 xi1/xi3 Avg T4-2 0.829 0.727 Avg T3-1 2 85.165 8.3%
xi3/xi4 xi2/xi3 Avg T4-3 0.923 0.923 Avg T3-2 3 92.262 8.4%
4 100
xj1/xj4 0.67 xj1/xj2
xj2/xj4 0.73 xj1/xj3 Not using ratios marked in yellow:
xj3/xj4 0.92 xj2/xj3 T4-1, T4-2, & T3-1
xk1/xk4 xk1/xk2
xk2/xk4 0.86 xk1/xk3
xk3/xk4 0.93 0.92 xk2/xk3
Ratios xk
Average ratios 
(across xi, xj, xk)Ratios xi
Ratios xj
CT-1 = Avg T4-3 x CT 
(100) 
CT-2 = Avg T3-2 x CT-1  
Figure 1.5: Complete Walkthrough of Backward Recursion Process 
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dyad values and projecting them relative to other time periods, the latent C needs to be 
interpreted as percent changes rather than an absolute level. 
Forward Recursion Process: 
Once the backward recursion process is understood, the forward recursion process is simple 
to understand. Steps 1, 2 and 3 from the backward recursion process are mirrored and 
tweaked to build the dyad ratios, averaging the existing dyads, and projecting the latent 
structure. Here, I note only the key differences when implementing the following steps for the 








4 50 60 70
Questions Items 
(Step 2)




4 50 60 70
Questions Items 
(Step 3)




4 50 60 70
Questions Items 
Illustration 2: Forward Recursion Dyads Walkthrough 




Dyads created - Step 2
xi3/xi2 -
xi4/xi2 1.25
Dyads created - Step 3
xi4/xi3 -
22




1. In contrast to the backward recursion, the first step here involves starting at the first period 
(T1) for an item, xi for instance, and building ratios relative to T1 for xi at all successive 
periods (T2, T3, & T4). Next, we continue the process by moving one period forward ([T1] + 
1 = T2) and building ratios relative to T2 for xi at all successive periods (T3 & T4). This 
process is repeated until the final period (T4). The results of the dyad ratios creation for all 
items can be seen in the forward recursion table in Figure 1.4. Once again, the effect of the 
initial missing values is evident as the resulting subset of ratios is similar to the forward 
recursion table in Figure 1.2 but features 3 missing values for each item.   
2. The averaging process for forward recursion mirrors the one used in the backward 
recursion. But instead of starting with the final period, the forward recursion begins with an 
arbitrary value (100) at the first period (T1) and moves forward in time. Thus CT+1, the latent 
structure at the T2 period, is estimated by using the absolute values for all items with existing 
values at T2 and in turn, existing dyad ratios for the T2 / T1 periods. Figure 1.6 shows the 
calculation of the averages for all items with existing values and how these averages are used 
in projecting the forward recursive estimates of the latent structure at all time periods, CT+1, 
CT+2 and CT+3. The percentage change of the latent structure over subsequent periods is 
shown in the column “Latent C (%change)” in Figure 1.6 and the formula is reversed to 
reflect the earlier periods starting with CT (T1) as the initial number. Stimson (2017) 
highlights another important quality of the Dyad Ratios when he says “When using backward 
recursion later periods tend to dominate the solution. Forward recursion has the reverse 
weighting of backward, earlier items contribute more to the solution than do later ones” 
(Stimson 2017, 11). 
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Consolidated Latent Structure Estimate:  
The final step in the Recursive Estimation process involves averaging the Forward and 
Backward recursive estimates of the latent structure, “CF and CB”, calculated in Figure 1.5 
and Figure 1.6. Stimson (2017) notes that the first advantage of averaging CF and CB stems 
from using all the available information from the question items transformed into their 
respective dyads and avoiding the pitfalls of adverse selection. Furthermore, the averaging of 
CF and CB tackles the differences in weights produced by the backward and forward 
recursions discussed previously and gives the user a single summary score that balances the 
weights of the earlier and later periods in the dataset.  
❖ Is this a holistic description of the Dyad Ratios algorithm?  
The motive behind this section is not to replicate every single step and provide an exact 
description of the dyad ratios algorithm. The algorithm doesn’t end with the recursive 
estimation process discussed above as it involves three more stages that Stimson (2017) 
explains in more precise terms.  I focus on the recursive estimation process and describe it in 





xi2 / xi1 1.33333 xi3 / xi2 Avg T1-2 1.333333 1.083333 Avg T2-3 1 100
xi3 / xi1 1.25 xi4 / xi2 Avg T1-3 1.375 1.208333 Avg T2-4 2 133.333 33.3%
xi4 / xi1 1.66667 xi4 / xi3 Avg T1-4 1.583333 1.083916 Avg T3-4 3 144.444 8.3%
4 156.566 8.4%
xj2 / xj1 xj3 / xj2
xj3 / xj1 1.375 xj4 / xj2 Not using ratios marked in yellow:
xj4 / xj1 1.5 1.09091 xj4 / xj3 T1-3, T1-4, & T2-4
xk2 / xk1 1.08333 xk3 / xk2
xk3 / xk1 1.16667 xk4 / xk2





(across xi, xj, xk)
C
T+1 





= Avg T2-3 x C
T+1 
(100) 
Figure 1.6: Complete Walkthrough of Forward Recursion Process 
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estimation exposition provided here is a simplified version of the dyad ratios’ true formula to 
capture the spirit of the algorithm and rationalize its use in constructing the Climate Change 
Skeptic Index. The three additional stages carried out by the software package (Wcalc) that 
supports the dyad ratios are:  
1) Smoothing: Stimson (2017) argues that in combining the forward and backward recursive 
estimates (CF and CB), a smoothed approximation is better than data-determined estimates 
which have sampling error baked into their estimation process. The chosen model for the 
dyad ratios algorithm is an exponential smoothing model of the form: yt =αxt + (1−α) xt −1. 
2) Validity Estimation: During the recursive estimation, I assumed without proof that the 
items included in the dyad ratios to estimate the latent structure are valid indicators of it. 
Stimson (2017) suggests there are three alternatives for validity estimation: assuming perfect 
validity, estimating from the R2 of multiple regressions of an item as dependent on all other 
items, and iterative estimation. Stimson (2017) uses the iterative estimation approach that 
essentially creates a weighted average for the dyad ratios at each time point using their 
validity estimates “μi
2 ” as the weights. The validity estimates for each item i (μi
2), is the 
amount of variance shared between the item and the latent structure. Stimson (2017) notes 
that the iterative solution for this process is obtained when the difference in the μi
2 between 
past and present iterations differs by less than .001. Based on the theory of vector 
decomposition, Stimson (2017) argues that if the true values of the μi
2 were known, then we 
can state that the squared correlation between the latent structure and the item would be equal 
to μi
2. Thus, by comparing the squared correlations between the latent structure and each item 
for all N, and verifying that they differ by a small amount (.001) across time, we can build an 
iterative solution to gauge the respective item’s validity and use it as a weight to estimate the 
respective dyad ratio. 
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3) Bootstrapping Errors: The need for bootstrapping arises from the lack of readily available 
standard errors automatically generated by the estimator. Stimson (2017) asserts that 
bootstrapping is empirically a “second best” alternative than other options and espouses its 
statistical foundation when he states “the fundamental idea of bootstrapping is that we can 
subject the estimator to variation of known magnitude in data input and then observe its 
behavior” (Stimson 2017, 16). The inferred variations in data input improves with the number 
of observations and is simply a protracted description for the standard deviation of the 
distribution.   
❖ Alternative estimators and the rationale for using Dyad Ratios:  
In the Methodology section, I briefly contrasted the dyad ratios with the simple and weighted 
averages as tools to build the potential proxy for climate skepticism. Despite the reproduction 
of the recursive estimation process of the Dyad Ratios in this section, there are several 
elements of the algorithm that I failed to replicate on excel. This inability to replicate every 
aspect of the Dyad Ratios algorithm on a spreadsheet layout renders its black box qualities 
and raises questions about its applicability for estimating the latent structure of climate 
skepticism. The graphs in Figure 1.8 are a crucial first step to justify the use of Dyad Ratios. 
Figure 1.8 plots the timeseries estimates of the latent structure of climate skepticism varying 
from Q1 2000 to Q4 2015 provided by the three estimators I’ve already discussed. The 
Climate Change Skeptic Index (CCSI) is a name inspired by the Climate Change Threat 
Index created by Brulle et al. (2012) and will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
section. The actual survey data used in the empirical analysis section of the paper was used to 
create a simple average estimate, weighted average estimate, and a dyad ratios estimate. The 
simple and weighted averages were created on an excel sheet using simple INDEX & 
MATCH functions to filter the survey questions by year, average all the marginals and adjust 
their weights by the sample size. For the dyad ratios estimation, a software package called 
26




Wcalc (described in the CCSI section) was used to produce the timeseries. Coming back to 
Figure 8, this side-by-side comparison with the averages provides an initial screening and 
shows that the data generating process of the dyad ratios is consistent and produces close 
estimates to the average. Next, I look at an Item Response Theory alternative to build the 
latent structure and conclude with the rationale for sticking with the Dyad Ratios algorithm. 
❖ McGann’s Item Response Theory and Criticism of the Dyad Ratios 
Item Response Theory (IRT) models have been a standard method used predominantly in the 
field of psychology but have found particular use cases in contemporary political science 
research. IRT was considered an important innovation for researchers in psychometrics as it 
provided an alternative for the Classical Test Theory and captured the interactions between 
survey items and individual-level responses in a similar manner as probit regression models. 
Implementing an IRT model allows the researcher to render an S-shaped curve to analyze 
dichotomous items using estimation techniques like maximum likelihood and other Bayesian 
methods. Despite these use cases, McGann (2013) highlights the fact that most of the existing 
IRT approaches only work with individual-level response and cannot be applied to aggregate 
Figure 1.8: Dyad Ratios Justification 

















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
CCSI Comparison - Dyad Ratios Vs Averages
Dyad Ratios Simple Average Weighted Average
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level data in the same way as the Dyad Ratios algorithm. Next, I briefly discuss McGann’s 
IRT approach that can deal with aggregate level data and describe his criticisms of the Dyad 
Ratios algorithm. 
IRT Model of Policy Mood: Unlike the Dyad Ratios algorithm, McGann’s IRT approach 
assumes item validity, i.e. the items chosen by the researcher to estimate the latent structure 
(or mood) are assumed to be valid indicators. Beginning with this assumption, the model 
states that there is a probability function to assess the respondent’s answer and categorize it 
as “correct” (for instance - estimating climate skepticism, correct would equate to answering 
as a skeptic). Next, each question has two parameters: difficulty and discrimination that affect 
the probability of the correct response. The parameters instigate the variations in the 
probability of the correct response and McGann (2013) explains that if the variable 
measuring the position of the respondent is greater than the difficulty parameter, the 
probability of a correct response is greater than 0.5. Similarly, a low discrimination parameter 
coupled with a respondent’s greater ability to answer a question correctly (i.e. the 
respondent’s position variable > difficulty parameter) will render a probability that is closer 
to 1. Figure 1.9 below depicts the varying probabilities of answering correctly captured by 
three question items. McGann (2013) uses this foundation to develop the IRT model, run 
other mathematical transformations to improve the estimation results and implements it using 
a Bayesian inference software such as JAGS or BUGS (McGann 2013, 120).  
Criticism of Dyad Ratios: The main criticism of the Dyad Ratios by McGann (2013) relates 
to the apparent “asymmetry” between dyad ratios due to differences induced by choosing the 
left-wing (or non-skeptical) responses versus right-wing (or skeptical) responses as the object 
of the ratio. McGann (2013) uses this example to show that a shift from 20% to 60% gives a 
ratio of 1:3 but a shift from 80% to 60% gives a ratio of 4:3. This might not be the best 
representation of the relative changes in policy mood. There is a concession that the problem 
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could be mitigated by the Dyad ratio algorithm as it repeatedly “reweights items based on 
commonalities”, meaning it verifies the weight of each question item by its ability to indicate 
the latent structure.  
Stimson’s Defence of Dyad Ratios: Stimson (2017) doesn’t directly address the concerns 
raised by McGann (2013) but implies that the comparison between the IRT and Dyad Ratios 
might not be a point-by-point comparison since it’s a case where both the mathematical 
model and the input data of the approaches vary. But, Stimson (2017) shows that the latent 
structure estimates produced by both Dyad Ratios and IRT converge and hence can be used 
to model the empirical approach for similar purposes. 
The observed differences between the two approaches and the criticisms of the Dyad Ratios 
algorithm do not discourage its use case for this paper. The marginal benefits stemming from 
McGann’s IRT code, deciphering and implementing it for this empirical study do not 
supersede its incremental costs. The Dyad Ratios provides a convenient way of building a 
consistent latent structure estimate using the Wcalc software and helps achieve the key 
agenda of evaluating trends by running regression analyses. Ideally, I would have liked to 
demystify the “black-box nature” of certain components in the Dyad Ratios algorithm and 
replicate it perfectly. But the rational approach is to consider the scope of this academic 
paper, the opportunity costs involved in exploring the IRT (or other valid methods) and make 
the pertinent trade-off for the greater good. 
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The crux of every serious claim made in this research paper rests on the clarity of the 
empirical strategy. Theoretically, the key goals of the paper are straightforward. I’ve 
discussed a few broad ideas involving the existence of an aggregate-level measure of climate 
skepticism and refer to contemporary literature to theorize the potential factors that influence 
this phenomenon over time. Empirically, the agenda is manifold but can be summarized into 
five overarching stages: 1) to build this aggregate-level measure of climate skepticism in a 
logical and realistic manner, 2) to find the best way to combine this measure analytically with 
data pertaining to the key explanatory variables, 3) to assess the quality of the results 
obtained from the model, 4) to interpret the results and contextualize them within the project 
definition and 5) to critically discuss the implications of the findings by making focused, 
statistically justified observations about the factors explaining climate skepticism. To tackle 
this agenda, the empirical section will be divided into three sub-sections. First, I examine the 
data generation process (DGP) that renders the Climate Change Skeptic Index (CCSI), the 
aggregate-level measure of climate skepticism in the US. This part also discusses the well-
known multivariate time series model, vector autoregression (VAR), which will be used to 
study the relationships between the CCSI and variables representing recessionary economic 
factors and partisanship. The second sub-section will take a comprehensive look at all the 
data used in the analysis and state the various hypotheses tests that will be assessed through 
the VAR. Lastly, I conclude with an interpretation and discussion of the results to address the 
key takeaways from the analysis.   
❖ DGP: Climate Change Skeptic Index 
During the ideation phase of this paper, the intent was to test empirical claims of factors 
influencing public opinion on climate change in the US. Further exploration led to 
discovering extensive literature on the culture of climate skepticism. Initially, as I 
Back to Contents 
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brainstormed plausible ways of formulating a thesis from these intriguing ideas, the task of 
building an aggregate-level measure of climate skepticism seemed insurmountable. But this 
persistent search for plausible estimators of climate skepticism led to the climate change 
threat index (CCTI) (Brulle et al., 2012). The inspiration and guidance for formulating the 
CCSI came directly from Brulle et al. (2012) and the methodology used to create the CCTI. 
In the Stimson Algorithm section, I explored the underlying dyad ratios method that directs 
the process of the Wcalc program. Here I will discuss the stylistic elements of the data used 
to build the CCSI, including the criterion used to qualify survey questions for the index and 
their respective descriptive stats. 
 
CCSI Construction and General Facts: The raw survey data for the CCSI was gathered from 
two different sources and merged into one master dataset to ease the recoding process needed 
to meet the requirements of the Wcalc program. The first source was the iPoll+ database 
hosted by Cornell University’s Roper Center. The Roper Center is home to a vast amount of 









2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Climate Change Skeptic Index 
(recessions and key political events) 
Recession Periods CCSI
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Times, etc. A database search with the keywords “climate change”, “global warming”, and 
“greenhouse” yielded a total of 268 questions for the timeline filter: 1st January 2000 – 31st 
December 2015. Next, I manually verified these 268 questions to exclude all items irrelevant 
to the construction of the CCSI. The manual selection was verified multiple times to 
maximize the effort to avoid human error and bias. To standardize the selection process, I 
established two broad screening categories to ensure that questions related to these themes 
made it into the CCSI. The first category captured questions on climate skepticism and was 
further divided into three sub-categories. 1) “Belief”- these types of questions test whether 
the respondent simply believes that climate change/global warming is real/occurring. 2) 
“Science” – these types of questions test whether the respondent disagrees with the scientific 
consensus on climate change or disputes basic scientific facts. 3) “Attitude” – these types of 
questions attempt to gauge the respondent’s attitude towards climate change and check for 
skeptic/denial responses to questions about climate change action. The second category 
includes slightly tougher questions related to the nature of the cause of climate change. 
Essentially, this category aims to capture questions that test the respondent’s belief that 
climate change (or global warming) is not anthropogenic, i.e. not caused by human activities 
and attributed to natural changes. Another critical decision involved determining which 
survey marginal responses to include in the formulation of the CCSI for the relevant 
questions. Most questions had approximately five responses along these lines: strongly agree, 
agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and strongly disagree. Based on the question 
content, the survey marginals (percentage of total respondents choosing a particular option) 
of both positive (“strongly agree” and “agree”) or negative (“strongly disagree” and 
“disagree”) responses were combined to record the respective item’s skeptic response value. 
This question-filtering process from the first source resulted in a dataset with 101 total 
question items coming from 69 unique questions. 18 polling organizations asked these 
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questions for the target period of Q1 2000 to Q4 2015 and the dataset has a sample size of 
115,355 respondents. Though the iPoll+ database hosted questions from the Gallup 
organization, I was able to find 8 other questions related to climate skepticism on their 
official website which matched the selection criterion. These questions were re-coded in a 
similar manner and the resulting dataset consisted of 85 total questions from the 8 unique 
questions administered to 84,000 respondents for the target time period. After combining 
these two datasets, we are ready to use the Wcalc program to create the CCSI.  
Basic Instructions - Wcalc Program: The Wcalc program was created by James Stimson for 
researchers to input data and build a timeseries latent estimate based on his Dyad Ratios 
algorithm. Wcalc is very specific on how it reads the input file and essentially requires all 
data classified into four categories: 1) Date, 2) Variable Name, 3) Marginal Score, and 4) 
Sample Size. The raw dataset from iPoll+ already provides three of the four filters for the 
data and I already explained how the remaining one (survey marginals) was built. An 
extensive documentation of how to use Wcalc has been provided by the author, Stimson 
(2017). Table S2 and S3 in the Appendix provides descriptive stats like the mean and standard 
deviation for the questions inputted into Wcalc. A comprehensive list including full text of 
chosen questions, polling organization, CCSI Iteration History by Wcalc, etc. can be found in 
the Appendix as well. As a reminder, Table S3 only shows 19 questions since the dyad ratios 
algorithm requires a minimum repetition of 2 cases over the chosen time period.  
Now that we have understood the process and steps involved in the construction of the 
CCSI, we take a deeper look at the data generating process of the VAR model. I believe that 
understanding the data generating process is an essential precursor to reliably interpret the 
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❖ DGP: Vector Autoregression Model 
I have previously mentioned that the methodology used in Brulle (2012) was a big inspiration 
for the empirical strategy of this paper. But prior to making the decision of using a VAR 
model, I researched other ways to model the key theoretical questions about climate 
skepticism. Some of the alternative empirical strategies were discussed in the literature 
review. The closest alternative idea was to run simple OLS or logit regression analyses 
immediately before and after recession periods to study its impact on climate skepticism. A 
drawback of this approach is that it fails to account for past periods of variables influencing 
current period estimates. This is especially important when considering that recessionary 
effects might take time to impact people’s lives and public opinion on issues like climate 
change are never static. Another drawback comes from the inability to account for 
uncertainty with respect to the nature of the variables included in the model, i.e. whether a 
certain variable and all previous period estimates of it are truly exogenous to the specified 
model. The VAR system mitigates these problems and turns out to be a valuable tool in 
analyzing variations in climate skepticism over longer periods of time. The natural question 
to consider is: “What is a VAR and what does it mean?”. Our work in this section is not to 
simply restate definitions and equations that can be easily found elsewhere. I will strive to 
provide an explicit answer to this question while being cognizant of the layperson’s needs 
and the scope of this paper. For this purpose, the VAR model can be broken down into five 
steps: 1) model specification, 2) pre-estimation steps, 3) estimation of VAR, 4) post-
estimation causality steps, and 5) post-estimation diagnostics. My focus will be on the first 
three steps to ensure there is sufficient clarity. The final two steps are important but have 
been covered extensively by academics and are done mostly to analyze the relevance of our 
results and gain confidence on the estimations.  
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1. Model Specification 
The VAR system is often chosen when researchers are not sure of the exogeneity of the 
included variables in the model. For instance, one set of variables used in this paper pertain to 
media coverage of climate change. There is no discernible way to say that environmental and 
conservative magazine articles are strictly exogenous, i.e. are independent and unaffected by 
current levels and past values of other variables in the model. To help understand and 
walkthrough the rest of the VAR model, I will use a variable subset from the main data as a 
guide for the rest of this section. Readers can follow along using the “Stata VAR 
Excelification.xlsx” and “VAR Excelification (dead).xlsx” files. A bivariate third-order 
model consisting of unemployment rate (y) and the CCSI (z) will be used for reference. The 
“’AR” part of the VAR model stands for “autoregressive” or variables that can be influenced 
by past values of their own sequence. The “third-order” simply indicates the number of lags 
(3) that will be included in the model. The number of lags refers to how many previous 
periods of the variables will be included in the model. Since all variables in the VAR model 
are endogenous, they will each appear on the left-hand side of the equation once and will be 
estimated at current levels (i.e. time, t) by regressing past realizations of their own values (3 
lags = t-1, t-2, t-3) and past and current realizations of other included variables in the system.  
The bivariate third-order model is represented in its standard form in Figure 2.1. The 
properties of the error (also known as innovations) terms (e1t and e2t) are crucial and 
represent white-noise processes that are stationary (we will learn why this is important in the 
next step) and correlated with one another. The sequences for the error terms are recreated in 
excel using the formula “=NORMINV(RAND(),0,1)”. The NORMINV function returns the 
Figure 2.1: Bivariate VAR: Standard Form Equations 
VAR (3rd Order Model):
yt (unemployment) = a10+ a11.yt-1 + a12.yt-2 + a13.yt-3 + a14.zt-1 + a15.zt-2 + a16.zt-3 + e1t
zt (CCSI) = a20 + a21.yt-1 + a22.yt-2 + a23.yt-3 + a24.zt-1 + a25.zt-2 + a26.zt-3 + e2t
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inverse of a probability corresponding to the normal cumulative distribution (i.e. RAND(), 
which returns a random number > = 0 and less than 1) for the specified mean (0) and standard 
deviation (1). If the VAR model isn’t specified in its standard form, I cannot apply ordinary 
least squares (OLS) techniques to estimate the coefficients. The primitive form of the VAR 
disallows using OLS because “yt has a contemporaneous effect on zt and zt has a 
contemporaneous effect on yt” (Enders 2011, 285). To be precise, the yt sequence will 
influence the zt sequence and vice-versa during the same time period that we try to estimate 
their parameter values and hence runs into a multicollinearity problem with the regressors 
and the errors terms ending up correlated. Now that I have specified the VAR model, let’s 
move onto a few pertinent pre-estimation steps.  
2. Pre-Estimation Steps 
Stationarity tests and optimal lag length selection tests are the two key pre-estimation steps 
that must be done before we can proceed onto estimating the VAR. Though I have already 
specified that the third-order model was chosen, let’s take a look at the intricacies involved in 
that lag length selection process. First, I tackle two important questions: “What does it mean 
for a process to be stationary?” and “Why does it matter for our VAR model?”. There are 
three necessary conditions for a timeseries to be considered stationary. Firstly, the 
expectation of our process, let’s call it yt, needs to be equal to some constant, μ. Secondly, the 
variance of yt needs to be equal to σ2, again a constant. Finally, the covariance for yt with yt+h 
is some function of h (f[h]), and not a function of time. Essentially, the key thing to 
remember here is that our process, yt, comes from some data generating process (DGP) that is 
similar across all time periods. A process that satisfies these conditions is classified as 
stationary and this basically assures that the yt process is not generated by different DGPs 
from one period to the next and is consistent irrespective of time.  
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To explain why stationarity matters for our VAR and understand how to run a 
stationarity test on Stata and replicate it in excel, I reintroduce the bivariate model (see 
Figure 2.1) discussed previously but only consider a first-order model (1 lag) to narrow our 
focus. My steps can be followed along using the excel file “VAR Excelification (dead)”. 
Figure 2.2 is a screenshot of the data table you will find in the “VAR_DFTest” sheet. There 
are two main reasons for the stationarity conditions in the VAR model (and most timeseries 
models). First, stationarity helps estimate any linear interdependencies between the included 
variables for the given period. For instance, in Figure 2.2 if the CCSI or the unemployment 
series were nonstationary, then I would struggle to accurately interpret the coefficient 
estimates and describe the relationships shared by the two series across the target time period. 
The second reason is a theoretical one and according to Lambert (2013), without stationary 
timeseries we wouldn’t be able to leverage the Law of Large Numbers and the Central Limit 
Theorem for inference purposes.  
Running and Replicating Stationarity Tests: A common way econometricians test for non-
stationary timeseries is by running a Dickey-Fuller test for the presence of a unit root process. 
The mathematics behind the unit root process is beyond the scope of this thesis and the reader 
can refer to the appendix for information and resources to understand the mechanics behind 
Figure 2.2: Screenshot of bivariate (first order) VAR used for Step 2  
VAR- Stationarity Replica Constants: a10: 0.303 Parameters: a11: 0.989 a12: -0.009







(CCSI) ▲zt yt-1 zt-1
2000Q1 17.145 4.03 -0.991 0.959 0 0 0 0 0 0
2000Q2 17.145 3.93 -0.746 -0.095 -0.443 -0.443 3.152 3.152 0 0
2000Q3 17.985 4.00 0.864 -1.335 0.700 1.143 2.508 -0.644 -0.443 3.152
2000Q4 18.268 3.90 0.994 -0.665 1.966 1.266 3.886 1.378 0.700 2.508
2001Q1 18.095 4.23 0.203 1.945 2.416 0.450 7.907 4.021 1.966 3.886
2001Q2 18.157 4.40 -1.776 0.388 0.846 -1.570 7.911 0.004 2.416 7.907
2001Q3 21.808 4.83 0.729 0.511 1.798 0.952 6.798 -1.113 0.846 7.911
2001Q4 23.044 5.50 -1.338 -0.461 0.682 -1.116 6.242 -0.556 1.798 6.798
2002Q1 21.038 5.70 1.449 -2.158 2.370 1.689 3.499 -2.743 0.682 6.242
2002Q2 20.76 5.83 0.797 -0.219 3.413 1.042 5.946 2.447 2.370 3.499
2002Q3 20.721 5.73 -1.445 -0.529 2.180 -1.233 7.191 1.245 3.413 5.946
2002Q4 20.735 5.87 0.672 1.109 3.066 0.886 8.231 1.039 2.180 7.191
37
Sambatur: What Explains Climate Skepticism in the US?
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2019
 
 
it. But, in short, the “unit root problem is concerned with the existence of characteristic roots 
of a time series model on the unit circle” (Tsay 2008, 1). The existence of a unit root in the 
VAR process is not a good sign as it indicates that the series may be nonstationary and carries 
negative implications. The stationarity test begins with a null hypothesis that the chosen 
timeseries variables, yt and zt, are nonstationary and the alternative hypothesis that they are 
stationary. The Dickey-Fuller test is used in lieu of an ordinary t-test because under the null 
hypothesis, the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) fails, and I’m unable to use an ordinary t-
distribution to test the t-statistic. To tackle this issue, I take the first differences of the 
timeseries as it has a better chance of producing a stationary process. At the minimum, even 
if the right-hand side processes are nonstationary, I am in a better position with the first 
differenced series on the left. The delta-yt and delta-zt columns in the excel file show this 
transformation and help us continue the stationarity test. The first-differencing improves our 
situation but I still cannot use an ordinary t-test. I run into the same problem as before 
because under the null hypothesis, yt-1 and zt-1 are still considered to be nonstationary and 
thus the t-statistic is still not comparable to the t-distribution (CLT fails). This is where 
Dickey and Fuller (1979) enter the scene and save us the hassle of tabulating the asymptotic 
distribution of the least squares estimator for a11, a12, a21, and a22, the coefficients of yt-1 and 
zt-1, under the null hypothesis that these processes are unit root. The final step for checking 
whether the series are nonstationary is straightforward as I simply compare the t-statistic with 
the Dickey-Fuller distribution. Figure 2.3 shows the results of the Dickey-Fuller test on Stata 
and depicts our attempt at replicating the same test in the “VAR_DF Test” sheet of the “VAR 
Excelification(dead)” excel file. If you hit F2 in the t-stats table in Excel, you can see how the 
LINEST function is built using the first differences of yt and zt. The t-statistics found via 
excel match the ones given by Stata and this confirms that the replication method is accurate.    
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The second pre-estimation step is the optimal lag length selection test. This step is a 
crucial part of the identification process needed before I can reliably estimate the VAR. Let’s 
revert back to the third order bivariate VAR shown in Figure 2.1 since I only used the single 
order model to simplify the DF tests excel replication. 
Optimal Lag Lengths: While it is technically possible to allow different variables in the VAR 
to have varying lag lengths, it does not help use OLS estimation techniques since they require 
identical regressors on the right-hand side for each equation. Selecting the lag length is also 
important because it determines how many coefficients I’ll have to estimate from the model. 
A model with p lag lengths and n equations will contain n*p coefficients plus the intercept 
term. Enders (2011) captures the perils of not choosing the optimal lag length and states: “If p 
is too small, the model is mis specified; if p is too large, degrees of freedom are wasted” 
(Enders 2011, 303). As you may have guessed, I had run the optimal lag length test on Stata 
using the “varsoc” command and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) picked 3 lags for 

















Figure 2.3: Excel Replication of Stata DF Test Results 
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provided in the Appendix. To maintain focus on the VAR steps that can explicitly be 
replicated on Excel and to avoid resharing theoretical knowledge already stated by 
academics, I push ahead to the next section. Now that the VAR model is specified and the 
pre-estimation due diligence is completed, I’m ready to estimate the model specified in 
Figure 2.1.  
3. Estimation of the VAR 
The standard form equations of the model are specified in Figure 2.1. An important thing to 
note is that we always specify our VAR model in levels and not in differences. Specifying the 
VAR in differences will result in mis-specification because the right-hand side variables will 
vary across all equations in the model. Another key thing to remember is that the results from 
the Dickey-Fuller test determine whether the VAR model can be constructed as specified. 
This means that if the raw series is nonstationary, it must be stationary after first difference 
(integrated of order 1, I(1)) or else it cannot be included in the model. Both the CCSI and 
unemployment series are stationary. The estimation of the VAR model in Stata is done using 
the command “var ytunemployment ztCCSI, lags(3)”. This command spits out the estimation 
results as shown in Figure 2.4. Stata gives us 6 coefficients and one intercept term for each 
equation (number of equations (n) * lags (p)) and the estimates table is divided into two mini 
sections with the bolded variable representing the key endogenous variable for the respective 
equation. The first coefficient, 1.561, adjacent to the “L1” row of the ytunemployment is 
basically the a11 estimate depicted in the standard form equations in Figure 2.1. The second 
coefficient, -0.371, corresponds to the a12 estimate and so on.  
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In terms of interpreting all these numbers, some researchers can intuitively jointly 
interpret all the lagged values of the regressors. But the conventional way is to interpret them 
in the same manner as an OLS regression. For instance, the a11 estimate can be interpreted as 
the first lag of the unemployment rate (yt-1) having a positive impact of 1.56 percentage 
points on average (at the 1% significance level) on the current level of unemployment (yt) 
holding all its lagged values and those of other variables constant. While this type of 
interpretation is valid and gives the researcher some insights, most econometricians prefer 
running causality checks that help interpret the causal link of the combined lags of a variable 
with other variables. Other use a visual tool to interpret these results and engage in 
forecasting by seeing how the variables respond to different shocks in the model. This tool is 
called an impulse response function and I exclude it from this thesis since the focus is less on 
Figure 2.4: Stata VAR Estimation Results 
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forecasting and more so on finding the causal connections between CCSI and the key 
explanatory variables. For an intuitive way to understand the effect of the coefficients, open 
the “Stata VAR Excelification” excel file and scroll right in the “VAR_Replication” sheet to 
column AI. Hit F9 and observe the graph to visually see how the underlying coefficients 
impact the predicted ytunemployment in the graph. Estimating a VAR and being able to 
interpret it on Stata is great, but it does not help us understand the underlying data generating 
process of the model. To truly understand what is going on, I replicate this VAR estimation in 
excel and run simulations to draw comparisons with the Stata output.  
The excel replication discussion can be followed along by using the file “Stata VAR 
Excelification.xls”. As seen in Figure 2.4, I begin with the known timeseries of the CCSI, 
built using the Wcalc program, and the unemployment rate from Q1 2000 to Q4 2015 which 
gives an n = 64. The errors terms ‘bounce’ as they are built using the same function as the 
Dickey-Fuller tests to mimic white-noise processes. The bounce in the error terms comes 
because the function pulls a random number, using the specified parameters, from a 
probability distribution every time I run an operation in Excel. The data in columns F-M are 
live primarily due to these errors. Hitting F9 on your computer allows you to observe this live 
data and the effects of the sampling process. Next, to populate the F-M columns, which 
contain the lagged values of yt and zt, I need to incorporate the standard form equations from 
Figure 2.1. But the constraint to applying these equations is that I do not know the true 
parameter values and don’t possess any valid estimates. Hence, I use the coefficient estimates 
found through the Stata VAR estimation as starting values to build our excel replication. The 
named range “Parameter_Table” spans Cells F1 thru U2 and includes the constants and 
parameter estimates for the yt equation and the second row includes parameter estimates for zt 
equation. The downside is that I’m making a big assumption that the Stata estimates are 
reliable and unbiased. Let’s skip the first three cells of the yt column and assume zero values 
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since I need three lagged values of each variable to include in the standard form equations 
(yt-1, yt-2, yt-3, zt-1, zt-2, and zt-3). Thus, I begin with cell F7 and the formula inputted in 
the cell can be viewed by hitting F2 in excel. Essentially, I transform the standard form 
equations formula into excel here. The same step is repeated for zt and I enter its 
corresponding values in the formula. After I have copied the formula for all the cells in yt and 
zt, I can complete the remaining steps for the lagged values by either copying and pasting the 
yt and zt values in the respective lagged value columns or referencing the appropriate cells 
(hit F2 on the lagged value cells) for each lagged variable to their yt or zt equations.  
 Now that I have the full series of variables and their lagged values, I can use the built-
in LINEST function in excel to estimate the model. Since LINEST can only estimate one 
equation at a time we run it separately for yt and zt. To estimate the yt equation, I highlight 
the 7 columns and 5 rows, [P4:V8] range (LINEST always includes 5 rows but the number of 
columns depends on the coefficients being estimated) and input the formula (hitting F2 
anywhere in the table displays the formula but remember to exit by hitting the ESC key). I 
repeat the process in the [P10:V15] range for the zt equation. In the yt equation’s LINEST 
table, cell U4 is the coefficient estimate of the a11 parameter and the estimates flow in a 
reverse chronological order ending with P4 estimating the a16 parameter. Notice that the 
estimates in the table continue to bounce since the data is still live. To verify our excel VAR 
replication effort, I can run a simulation that repeats these OLS estimates multiple times and 
plots the resulting sampling distribution. A 10,000 repetitions simulation of the U4 cell 
returns an average (coefficient estimate) of 1.505 (see the “a11_sim” sheet) and an 
approximate SE of 0.1332. At first glance it might seem tough to make a statement of 
whether 1.505 is close enough (to the assumed a11 parameter of 1.56) but it becomes evident 
that this estimate is biased when I look at the value in cell M7 (highlighted in yellow). I did a 
simple calculation in cell M7 to test whether the approximate SE is large enough to allow for 
43
Sambatur: What Explains Climate Skepticism in the US?
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2019
 
 
the error in the coefficient estimate to form an interval that included the a11 parameter value 
of 1.56. Unfortunately, the resulting estimate is biased, and running similar simulations (see 
sheets under “Simulations” tab) of other coefficients garners mixed results as some 
simulations produce unbiased estimates (a13). Consistency of the estimator is another 
important quality that one should care about, and Figure 2.5 illustrates that the excel VAR 
model is consistent. I arrive at this conclusion because as n rises (from 32 to 64), the 
estimates converge to the true mean. 
 
Excel Replication with Dead Data: Replicating the Stata VAR model with live data on excel 
gave us a lot of insights on the quality of the estimator and helped understand the black box 
nature of the DGP. But it still leaves a gnawing doubt of whether my excel replication is 
following the exact DGP and estimation technique of the Stata model. To clarify these 
doubts, I run the VAR estimation again in Figure 2.6 but this time using deadened data 
instead of live data. The VAR result shown in Figure 2.6 is available in the same file used to 
run the DF tests, “VAR Excelification (dead)”.  This is done by simply copying the error 
series (e1t & e2t) and pasting them as values. The rest of the process remains the same on 
Average 1.402 Average 1.505 n = 32 Vs n = 64
SD 0.2379 SD 0.1332 See Sheet: VAR_Replication
Max 2.263 Max 2.018 0.00133
Min 0.359 Min 0.947 Parameter value: 1.56
Coefficient Estimate of 
a11 (cell U17) with n=32
Coefficient Estimate of 
a11 (cell U4) with n=64 Notes
0.35 0.85 1.35 1.85




Figure 2.5: Proof of the Estimator’s Consistency  
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excel and the results of the LINEST function can be seen in Figure 2.6. A sure-fire way of 
verifying the excel replication of VAR is by importing this deadened data seen in Figure 2.6 
into Stata and running the VAR estimation command on it. After importing the data and 
completing the necessary recoding I obtain the results shown in Figure 2.7 using Stata’s 
VAR command. The estimated coefficients in the Stata VAR table precisely match the ones I 
computed on the excel LINEST table! This is exciting since it clarifies any doubts over the 
excel-VAR replication DGP matching Stata’s DGP.  
 
CCSI_VAR- Replica Constants: a10: 0.09 Coefficients: a11: 1.56 a12: -0.37 a13: -0.26 a14: 0.006 a15: -0.02 a16: 0.03







(CCSI) yt-1 yt-2 yt-3 zt-1 zt-2 zt-3
Excel 
Replica
2000Q1 17.145 4.03 -0.110 0.540 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0886 0.16186 -0.0485 -0.1671 -0.5232 1.58966 -0.0008
2000Q2 17.145 3.93 -0.907 -1.180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06734 0.11393 0.08556 0.16305 0.24849 0.13179 0.36705
2000Q3 17.985 4.00 -0.060 -0.788 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.97759 0.85628 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
2000Q4 18.268 3.90 0.540 2.117 0.6305 5.1673 0 0 0 0 0 0 414.367 57 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
2001Q1 18.095 4.23 -1.132 -1.657 -0.0278 6.2854 0.630 0 0 5.167 0 0 1822.91 41.7929 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
2001Q2 18.157 4.40 0.355 0.727 0.1024 8.4655 -0.028 0.630 0 6.285 5.167 0 LINEST
2001Q3 21.808 4.83 1.153 -0.037 1.3296 9.4004 0.102 -0.028 0.630 8.465 6.285 5.167 0.03749 0.05239 0.79827 -0.8927 0.29599 0.69996 1.94643
2001Q4 23.044 5.50 -0.629 -0.075 1.5803 11.3092 1.330 0.102 -0.028 9.400 8.465 6.285 0.09373 0.15856 0.11909 0.22694 0.34585 0.18342 0.51085
2002Q1 21.038 5.70 -1.075 -0.105 1.0957 13.6518 1.580 1.330 0.102 11.309 9.400 8.465 0.98512 1.19177 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
2002Q2 20.76 5.83 -1.520 0.085 -0.5133 14.3734 1.096 1.580 1.330 13.652 11.309 9.400 629.114 57 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
2002Q3 20.721 5.73 1.789 0.874 0.4143 14.1679 -0.513 1.096 1.580 14.373 13.652 11.309 5361.22 80.9576 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
yt (unemployment rate) equation
zt (CCSI) equation
Figure 2.6: Screenshot of deadened data and LINEST table  
Figure 7: Stata VAR Estimation of deadened data  
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With the excel replication done, I have now covered the key focus areas by investigating the 
three steps of specification, pre-estimation and, estimation of a simple VAR model. I will 
very briefly touch upon the last two steps of the model to avoid digression and repeating what 
others have explained better. Then I move onto the heart of my empirical analysis in the next 
section by describing the data used in this paper and setting up the main hypotheses.        
4. Post-estimation Steps 
The two main post-estimation steps that need to be done are causality checks and diagnostic 
tests. Equations in the VAR model can have high R-squared values without implying any 
causal connections between the dependent variable and its regressors. When the VAR model 
is applied to the CCSI in the next section and null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) is 
used to measure the significance of recessionary factors and political elite cues, the causality 
checks will determine whether I have enough evidence to reject the null. Finally, the 
diagnostic tests are done to ensure model integrity and gives us greater confidence and 
additional reliability to justify the model’s results. 
Causality Checks: There are three causality checks that can be used to determine a causal link 
between the CCSI and its regressors. First, Stata’s VAR table provides “p-values” for every 
coefficient estimated by the model. A low p-value is often interpreted as a statistically 
significant result. For instance, a p-value < 0.05 corresponds to a statistically significant 
result at the 95% significance level and a p-value < 0.01 corresponds to a statistically 
significant result at the 99% significance level. The main question here is: “How do you 
interpret a low p-value intuitively?” A low p-value tells us that there is enough evidence in 
the sample to reject the null for the underlying population. Assuming a true null hypothesis, a 
low p-value technically implies the probability of obtaining a resulting effect at least as 
extreme as the one in the sample data.  
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 The p-values only provide the statistical significance of individual coefficients and 
don’t provide an easy way to jointly measure the causality of all lags of a given regressor in 
the equation. The Granger Causality test is one way to solve this issue. For simple OLS 
regression models, I run F-tests that determine whether the increase in R-squared caused by 
adding new independent variables was significant and a comparison of the whole-model to 
the restricted model provided enough evidence to reject the null (of no significance). The 
Granger Causality test acts in a similar manner and gives us a criterion to determine whether 
the regressors and their lagged values “Granger cause” the key endogenous variable in the 
equation (i.e. CCSI, in our main models).  
 Lastly, the third causality check is called a “linear test of parameter estimates” and is 
usually known as the “Wald test”. The Wald test is another way to determine whether a 
regressor or any of its lagged values are causally linked to the key endogenous variable. To 
avoid delving into the complexities of the Wald test that have been better explained 
elsewhere, I explain only a simple scenario. In a Wald test with a univariate variable, the 




, where “𝜃” is the maximum likelihood estimate and “𝛿” 
is the parameter estimate and under the null hypothesis being true, this equation is chi-
squared distributed with 1 degree of freedom. 
Diagnostic Tests: As stated previously, the diagnostic tests provide mathematical justification 
to support the interpretation of the results from the VAR model. The three key areas that will 
be targeted using the diagnostics are: autocorrelation, normality of innovations (error terms), 
and stability. Firstly, the issue of autocorrelation (or serial correlation) of the errors terms can 
be defined as a condition when the covariance of an error, e1t, and some other error, e2t, is not 
equal to 0 and the two errors are not equal to each other. To keep things simple, when the 
VAR equations have autocorrelated errors then OLS is no longer the best linear unbiased 
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estimator (BLUE) since there are other estimators that perform better with this condition. The 
first diagnostic check, to test for autocorrelation, is called the Lagrange Multiplier test and 
can be run on STATA using the “varlmar, mlag(number of lags)” command. Running this 
command results in a table like those seen in the Data Analysis where I can use the p-values 
in the rightmost column to test the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the respective lag 
order. A low p-value indicates that the model specification doesn’t provide enough evidence 
to not reject the null of no autocorrelation. 
 The second diagnostic is done to check if the errors are normally distributed. There 
are many reasons why normality is important but most prominently, a normally distributed 
probability distribution makes the analysis easier and feasible. The true probability 
distribution is almost impossible to ascertain for the dataset but testing for normality in the 
errors helps capitalize on proven mathematical facts about the Central Limit theorem. The 
Jarque-Bera normality test can be done on STATA using the command “varnorm, jbera”. The 
output is a table that looks like the ones in the Data Analysis section and I can test the null 
hypothesis of normality using the p-values in the rightmost column again. A low p-value in 
this test indicates that there is evidence to reject the null of normally distributed errors in the 
respective equation.  
 Lastly, the third diagnostic checks for stability of our VAR model. The details of 
eigenvalue stability conditions are beyond the scope of this paper and will only be briefly 
discussed. In the realm of differential equations, solutions can be represented as summations 
of periodic contributions bounded by exponential functions. Eigenvalues represent the 
powers of these exponential functions (Dawkins 2019). The stability test can be run on Stata 
using the command “varstable” and the resulting table will clearly indicate whether all the 
eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle, an indication that the VAR satisfies the stability 
condition.      
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Applying the Model to CCSI 
Previously, in the empirical strategy section, I provided a general overview of the main DGP 
used to create the CCSI and using practical examples held a theoretical discussion of the 
VAR. Before I proceed onto the data analysis using the VAR, I will describe all the other 
endogenous variables that are theorized to influence climate skepticism and by extension, the 
VAR model. Lastly, this section will include a few hypothesis tests that will come in handy 
during the post-estimation phase of the analysis and help us in answering the key questions 
posed in this paper.  
Variables: The CCSI will be the key contemporaneously endogenous variable in every model 
that is tested. This is obvious because we are trying to capture the effects and variations in 
climate skepticism with correspondence to other endogenous variables. To recap, the CCSI is 
a timeseries (spanning from 2000 to 2015), built using survey marginals of polling data to 
estimate the aggregate-level of climate skepticism in the US. Based on inspiration from 
Brulle et al. (2012), contemporary literature (see Literature Review) and other theorized 
propositions, I have grouped my data into five categories: recessionary economic indicators, 
political elite cues, scientific information, extreme weather, and media coverage and 
Back to Contents 
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advocacy. Elite cues and structural economic variables will serve as my key explanatory 
variables while the rest will act as controls.  
1. Recessionary Economic Indicators: An economic recession is not consistently defined by 
all economists and there is a debate on what factors should be considered as predictors and 
indicators. Kenton (2019) and others often cite an approximate definition of recession as “two 
consecutive quarters of negative economic growth as measured by the country’s gross 
domestic product” (Kenton 2019). Moreover, economists often tout that weaknesses in 
industrial production and employment are historical indicators of an economic recession. 
Based on these observations, we’ve chosen five variables that can potentially capture the 
recessionary attributes of the economy. These include Real GDP (% change from preceding 
Figure 3.1: Summary Stats for Recessionary Economic Indicators 
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quarter), unemployment rate, industrial production index, total nonfarm payrolls (%change 
from preceding quarter), and a dummy variable for official recession dates (1 = quarter 
officially recorded as a recessionary period). Figure 3.1 provides summary statistics on each 
of these timeseries variables. As you can see, Figure 3.1 has a sixth variable, the price of oil. 
The inclusion of this variable is partly inspired by Brulle et al. (2012), but also because it is 
an important structural economic factor that has the potential of psychologically influencing a 
population. The Appendix contains specific information on the sources and recoding efforts 
of these variables.  
 
2. Political Elite Cues: Political elite cues are the second set of variables that will serve as key 
explanatory models in my data analysis. While the choice of these variables was inspired by 
Brulle et al. (2012) again, there is a strong rationale to include them based on contemporary 
research and my hypotheses tests that will be discussed next. Amongst commonly referenced 
Figure 3.2: Summary Stats  
for Political Elite Cues 
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papers, McCright and Dunlap (2011) finds polarization along political lines and their 
empirical analysis shows that Democrats hold consistent beliefs with the scientific consensus 
while Republicans’ beliefs represent a mismatch. The six variables in this category that I 
have chosen to test my hypothesis include: congressional hearing statements of Democrats 
favoring climate change action, congressional hearing statements of Republicans opposing 
climate change action, house hearings on climate change, senate hearing on climate change, 
league of conservation voters (LCV) Democrats pro-environmental score, and LCV 
Republicans anti-environmental score. Figure 3.2 provides summary statistics on these 
timeseries variables. Again, more information including descriptions, sources and recoding 
efforts of these variables are available in the Appendix. 
Typically, in most regression analyses, the researcher includes a range of control 
variables that help reduce the well-documented omitted variable bias in the model and 
improve the accuracy of the estimator. The multiple categories of data included as controls 
might tend to cause overparameterization of the model but there is sufficient research and 
theory backing correlations between climate skepticism and these variables. Moreover, as 
Enders (2011) states: “a VAR will be overparameterized in that many of these coefficients 
will be insignificant. However, the goal is to find the important interrelationships among the 
variables” (Enders 2011, 290). Thus, my approach is justified in continuing with these control 
variables as the prospect of finding crucial relationships between these series is greater than 
the risk of losing degrees of freedom and overparameterization. As I’ve already stated, please 
refer to the Appendix for further documentation on these variables. The remaining three 
categories of data are discussed below, and their summary statistics are available in the 
Appendix. All the variables data can be explored first-hand since the Stata and excel files to 
replicate the analysis are included in the paper. 
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3) Scientific Information: This category is self-explanatory as it helps factor in the influence 
of the scientific community’s contribution toward climate change in the model. I include two 
variables here: popular scientific magazine articles on climate change and a dummy variable 
noting periods which saw a release of major scientific reports on climate change (1 = quarters 
when at least one such report was released). 
4) Extreme Weather Conditions: Variables pertaining to extreme weather are one of the most 
commonly appearing in empirical papers. Researchers differ in what metrics they choose to 
use to capture the effects of this category but for my purposes I will stick with Brulle et al. 
(2012) and include: overall climate extremes index, US percentage areas (very warm), US 
percentage areas (very cold), and drought levels (using the Drought Severity Classification 
Index).  
5) Media Coverage and Advocacy: Finally, the media coverage and advocacy category is a 
natural contender as a control variable due to its widespread influence on the public’s 
perception of climate change. Since the nature and medium of media coverage has become so 
widespread, it makes sense to compile these various sources into one proxy variable. This is 
exactly what Brulle et al. (2012) does and I follow the same logic to build an additive index 
by compiling data from major television networks and weekly news magazines. Media 
advocacy is split into two segments to capture the “pro” and “anti” climate change sentiments 
often espoused by the competing media factions. These two segments are environmental 
magazines and conservative magazines on climate change.  
❖ Hypothesis Tests 
Given the vast dataset and a complex list of potential relationships between climate 
skepticism and the discussed variables, I make purposeful decisions to rein in the empirical 
strategy. Consequently, the Hypothesis tests are designed to narrow the focus on finding 
interdependencies between climate skepticism and the key explanatory variables falling in 
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either the recessionary economic indicators category or political elite cues. Before turning to 
the analyses, I set up two hypothesis tests to represent and test my initial expectations based 
on existing research and theory.  
The Role of Recessionary Factors in Inducing Climate Skepticism  
Imagining a causal link between economic recessions and climate skepticism might seem 
arbitrary at first glance, but a deeper consideration of people’s priorities and their short-
sightedness on such issues might unearth these complex relationships. Researchers and 
scholars have provided reasonable evidence to believe that the Great Recession of 2008 
negatively influenced public opinion on climate change (Scruggs & Benegal 2012). The 
threat perception of climate change and the issue salience of the matter is particularly low and 
public opinion surveys such as Gallup (2016) has stated that only about 1% polltakers name 
any environmental issue when asked to identify the most important problem facing the 
country. Thus, though my dataset includes only two major recessionary periods, I expect a 
delayed influence on skepticism since the negative effects and magnitude of recessions vary 
and take time to manifest in people’s lives.  
Hypothesis 1: Economic indicators of recession (such as unemployment rate, declining GDP, 
etc.) are more likely to heighten the aggregate-level climate skepticism in the US. 
The Role of Partisanship and Political Elite Cues in Inducing Climate Skepticism  
I’ve referenced multiple papers and sources that have researched and theorized the increased 
polarization along the lines of partisanship and political ideology. The divide between 
Democrats and Republicans on climate change existed back in the late 1980s but has grown 
larger over time and records as one of the most polarizing issues since the Great Recession 
(Egan & Mullin 2017, 218). Despite all the existing research, I hope to acquire a unique 
perspective from my model and understand the influence of political elites on the public 
mood regarding climate change. The interpretation of the results from this model will differ 
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because I estimate trends between statements and voting patterns of Democrats and 
Republicans in the Congress with climate skepticism. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, I 
split the political elite cues hypotheses into two parts to capture unilateral relationships 
between these dichotomous variables and the CCSI. 
Hypothesis 2(a): Pro-climate change statements and voting patterns of Democratic 
Congresspersons are more likely to lower the aggregate-level climate skepticism in the US. 
Hypothesis 2(b): Anti-climate change statements and voting patterns of Republican 
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At the beginning of the Empirical Strategy section, I established a 5-step agenda to simplify 
the complex DGP that the thesis has undertaken and extrapolate empirical findings to shed 
light on the theoretical discussions and existing literature on climate skepticism. The DGP 
overview and the Applying the Model to CCSI sections fulfilled the first couple of steps in the 
agenda and this data analysis section will cover the rest. The methodology discussion of the 
CCSI, replication attempts of the VAR, and definition of the hypothesis tests provide critical 
information in understanding the data analysis and interpreting the results at the end. Given 
the arsenal of timeseries data that I have to predict the CCSI at my disposal, the challenge 
becomes how to avoid overparameterization of the model while extracting relevant 
knowledge pertaining to the interrelationships among variables. I split the analysis into 2 
comprehensive models, one specified to identify any potential causal connections between 
recessionary economic indicators and climate skepticism. The second one serves a similar 
function but focuses on likely relationships between partisan politics and skepticism. Given 
that the VAR analysis has multiple pre and post-estimation steps attached to it, I will 
walkthrough each model separately, make specific observations of Stata’s output for each 
step, and interpret the estimation results from both models together at the end of the section. 
The data analysis procedure for the VAR models can be summarized as follows: 
1. Model Specification and Basic Setup 
2. Pre-estimation steps:  
a. Stationarity test (Augmented Dickey-Fuller)  
b. Optimal lag length determination (AIC, etc.) 
3. VAR model estimation  
4. Post-estimation steps: 
a. Diagnostic Tests (Autocorrelation, Normality, and Stability tests) 
b. Causality Checks (Granger causality and Wald tests) 
 
 
Back to Contents 
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❖ Model 1: Economic Recessions and CCSI 
Step 1 - Model Specification: To follow along, open the Stata file “VAR_CCSI.dta” and the 
do-file associated with Model 1, “Model1_Recession.ado”. The do-file has helpful comments 
corresponding to each step but it’s particularly useful for those seeking to replicate and run 
their own version of my VAR analyses. I discussed the challenges of imposing restrictions 
and specifying the model to best estimate the VAR. I know that the chosen variables in the 
reduced-form VAR need to pass stationarity tests before I can run the analysis. So, the 
question that needs to be answered is: “How do we specify the VAR and impose restrictions 
without knowing the stationarity conditions of the included timeseries variables?” This issue 
wasn’t specifically addressed in the DGP: Vector Autoregression section because there are 
several ways to tackle it and exploring it deeply would detract from the focus of my thesis. In 
short, econometricians usually impose restrictions in two ways. The first one is a Choleski 
decomposition and is sometimes criticized for its ad hoc nature and diminishing the role of 
the economist to one that merely suggests appropriate variables to include in the VAR 
(Enders 2011, 313). The second one is called a structural decomposition and imposes 
restrictions by combining economic theory with vector analysis. For the purposes of this 
paper, I use the first approach since I’m focused on uncovering the potential relationships 
between recessionary indicators and skepticism. The standard forms of Model 1 are shown in 
Figure 4.1 and the first four variables represent recessionary indicators while the next three 
are controls for media coverage, scientific information, and extreme weather. The standard 
practice is to order the key contemporaneously endogenous variable, i.e. the CCSI, last while 
the least endogenous variable, Recession Dates dummy, is ordered first in our reduced-form 
VAR. Stationarity tests and lag lengths of the model are discussed next.  
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Step 2(a) – Stationarity: The keen observer may have noticed that the Non-farm payrolls 
variable was excluded from our VAR and this is simply because it is nonstationary and failed 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. Stata commands for ADF tests are single-line 
commands that specify the timeseries and the chosen number of lags. Complete results of my 
ADF tests are shown in the data analysis section of the Appendix and I can move onto the 
next step since all the included variables are integrated of order 1 (I[1]), that is they are 
stationary after first difference. As a refresher to the DGP: Vector Autoregression section, the 
ADF test can be interpreted by comparing the p-value against the Dickey-Fuller critical 
values. Remember, I reject the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root if the p-value is 
lower than the DF critical values (at least the 10% level). Since all the chosen variables pass 
the stationarity tests, I can proceed with my analysis. 
Step 2(b) – Optimal Lag Length: The optimal lag length was given away when I specified the 
model using 4 lags. The results of Stata’s varsoc command to determine the optimal lag 
Model 1 VAR (4th Order Model):
y = CCSI, x = Recession Dates, z = Unemployment rate, r = Real GDP, i = IPI
y t (CCSI) = a10+ a11.y t-1 + a12.y t-2 + a13.y t-3 + a14.y t-4 + a15.xt-1 + a16.xt-2 + a17.xt-3 + a18.xt-4 + a19.z t-1 + 
a20.z t-2 + a21.z t-3 + a22.z t-4 + a23.r t-1 + a24.r t-2 + a25.r t-3 + a26.r t-4 + a27. i t-1 + a28. i t-2 + a29. i t-3 + a30. i t-4 + 
Lags(Contro ls: Media Index) + Lags(Controls: Scienti f ic Reports) + Lags(Controls: CEI) + e1t
Figure 4.1: Standard Form Equation for Model 1 
Figure 4.2: varsoc command results in Stata 
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length is shown in Figure 4.2 and I choose the AIC information criterion that specifies 4 lags. 
In practice, I run the varsoc command first on the specified model to identify the ideal 
number of lags and to include this number in my stationarity tests to run Augmented DF tests. 
 Step 3 - Model Estimation: When you run the “var” command as specified in the do-file, 
Stata spits out a total of 32 coefficients for each equation in the VAR. This isn’t surprising 
because I already know that each variable appears on the left-hand side once and has the 
same set of regressors as the other timeseries variables. Table 1 hosts only the main VAR 
estimation results (the equation with CCSI as the dependent variable) as I only care about the 
relationships between the CCSI and its regressors and want to learn if recessionary economic 
indicators are statistically significant and help predict the CCSI. The Stata table output is 
slightly different from my table here which is formatted differently to highlight key 
information. The Stata table provides coefficient estimates, standard errors, p-values, and 
95% confidence intervals. A quick glance to check for p-values shows that only some of the 
hypothesized recession variables are statistically significant. The null hypothesis significance 
testing for this model and the partisan politics model are based on the hypothesis I set up in 
the Applying the Model to CCSI section. I defer the hypothesis testing and interpretation of 
these coefficients to the VAR Model Interpretation and Discussion section where I can 
holistically discuss both models in tandem with each other. 
Step 4 (a) – Diagnostic Tests: I briefly discussed the diagnostic tests and called them “a form 
of post-mortem analysis of the VAR model.” Without these tests, the discussions of my 
findings become baseless and will lack any conviction among econometricians. The three 
diagnostics listed in my do-file are: the Lagrange-multiplier test for autocorrelation (Stata 
command: varlmar), the Jarque Bera test for normality (Stata command: varnorm, jbera), and 
a test for stability (Stata command: varstable). The Lagrange-multiplier test for our model is 
shown in Figure 4.3 and I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at all lag 
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orders since the chi-squared value is low and gives us a p-value that isn’t significant at the 
5% level. Overall, I can comfortably state that the Lagrange multiplier test finds no evidence 
of the existence of autocorrelation in Model 1. This result is a positive one because given the 
complexity of predicting the CCSI, my VAR model does well to escape the perils of 
autocorrelation. Potential reasons for the occurrence of autocorrelation and their drawbacks 
are discussed in the DGP: Vector Autoregression and Appendix sections.  
The second diagnostic test is the Jarque-Bera test for normality of the errors or 
innovation terms in the VAR. Notice that in the do-file, I run the Stata commands for all the 
diagnostic tests following the var command, so Stata knows which regression to use. Figure 
4.4 displays the results of the test and observing the p-value column, I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of normally distributed errors for all variables except Recession Dates. The last 
row of the table shows that the null cannot be rejected for all the error terms combined and 





 Figure 4.3: Lagrange-Multiplier Test Result 
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Finally, I test the stability condition of the model using the Eigenvalue stability 
condition. Figure 4.5 lists all the eigenvalues and the modulus for the model and the most 
important observation here is that the VAR model satisfies the stability condition. Please 
refer to the DGP: Vector Autoregression and Appendix sections for more information on 
what this entails. Let’s proceed onto the last step of running causality checks for the model.  
Figure 4.4: Jarque-Bera Test Result 
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Step 4 (b) Causality Checks: The three basic ways to check for causal links between my key 
explanatory variables and the CCSI were discussed earlier. I’ve already acquired the p-value 
and the t-statistics of the included variables through the var estimation process and I can use 
this to test individual coefficients for causality. Second, the Granger causality test is 
particularly useful in jointly determining causality of all the variables in the equation. Figure 
4.6 is a table of the Granger causality test for this model and I can reject the null hypothesis 
of no Granger causality at the 5% significance level for all variables except unemployment 
rate and release of scientific reports. Together, as seen on the last row of the table, it can be 
stated that all the regressors Granger cause CCSI at the 1% significance level and any 
inferential arguments of causality during the results discussion ought to be contemplated 
Figure 4.5: Eigenvalues – Stability Test Result 
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seriously. Another common way for researchers to assess causality is to use the direction and 
classify it under a certain type of causality. The three common ones are unidirectional (x 
Granger causes y but y doesn’t Granger cause x), bidirectional (if both x and y Granger cause 
one another), and independent (when neither x or y Granger cause each other). The complete 
excerpt of the Granger Causality Wald tests can be obtained by following the Do-file and 
executing the “vargranger” command. Interestingly, of the four explanatory variables, three 
possess unidirectional causality. So, I can conclude that at the 5% significance level and 
lower, lagged values of Recession Dates, Real GDP, and the Industrial Production Index 
Granger cause the CCSI.   
 
Lastly, to strengthen my conviction and add greater value to the results discussion I run 
the Wald tests on individual regressors, specifically the four recession indicators. Figure 4.7 
is a collage of all these linear tests of the parameter estimates and I notice that only the 
unemployment rate is not significant when tested individually but the rest of the variables are 
Figure 4.6: Granger Causality Wald Test Result 
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statistically significant and yield low p-values which reject the null hypothesis of no causality 
and implies statistical significance at the 5% level.  
 
❖ Model 2: Partisan Political Influence and CCSI 
Step 1 – Model Specification: The same Stata file (“VAR_CCSI.dta”) can be used to follow 
along again and the do-file associated with Model 2 is: “Model2_PoliticsControls.ado”. The 
standard form equations for Model 2 are listed in Figure 4.8. The chosen lag lengths (4) 
corresponds with the optimal lag length tests which will be discussed in the next step. 
Another noticeable aspect of this model specification are the omitted control variables that 
were discussed in the Applying the Model to CCSI section. This is done purposefully as I ran 
Figure 7: Wald Test Results Collage 
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multiple specifications to test for collinearity among the endogenous variables and 
unfortunately none of the series in the Media advocacy and coverage category made the cut 
as they failed the diagnostic tests. Since my focus is on the partisan influence of politics, I 
proceed with this reduced form VAR and analyze how well my model can predict the 
variance in the CCSI. The first 6 variables in the model represent my key explanatory 
variables that will be used to draw inferences in the results section. 
 
Step 2 (a) - Stationarity: The results of the ADF tests are shown in the Appendix and 7 of the 
9 timeseries variables are stationary after first difference (i.e. Integrated of Order 1). This is 
still acceptable because I care if the stationarity conditions are met by the included series and 
the restrictions mandate that the VAR model is only constructed if this stationary condition is 
satisfied to avoid spurious regressions. After running the Dickey-Fuller commands on Stata, I 
can use the ADF results to test the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root. I reject the 
null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root for all 9 series since the respective p-values are 
lower than the DF critical values. 
Figure 4.8: Standard Form Equation for Model 2 
Model 2 VAR (4th Order Model):
y = CCSI, x = Dem. Statements, z = Repub. Statements, r = LCV Dems Score, i = LCV Repub. Score, k= 
House Hearings, s = Senate Hearings
y t (CCSI) = a10+ a11.y t-1 + a12.y t-2 + a13.y t-3 + a14.y t-4 + a15.xt-1 + a16.xt-2 + a17.xt-3 + a18.xt-4 + a19.z t-1 + 
a20.z t-2 + a21.z t-3 + a22.z t-4 + a23.r t-1 + a24.r t-2 + a25.r t-3 + a26.r t-4 + a27. i t-1 + a28. i t-2 + a29. i t-3 + a30. i t-4 + a31.kt-1 + 
a32.kt-2 + a33.kt-3 + a34.kt-4 + a35.st-1 + a36.st-2 + a37.st-3 + a38.st-4 + Lags(Contro ls: US% Warm Areas) + Lags(Controls: 
Scienti f ic Reports) + e2t
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Step 2 (b) - Optimal Lag Length Selection: The varsoc command on Stata returns the table 
output with the asterisks marking the chosen lag lengths under different information criterion. 
Figure 4.9 displays these results and as I did with Model 1, I choose the AIC option of 4 lag 
lengths. This marks the completion of the pre-estimation steps and we proceed with the 
estimation and post-estimation steps to round up this walkthrough. 
Step 3 – Model Estimation: Again, the main relevant regression results are displayed in Table 
2. Running the var command on Stata spits out a ton of equations with symmetrical 
regressors and coefficient estimates. Table 2 only focuses on the CCSI and a glance at the 
table shows us that there are quite a few explanatory variables with statistically significant 
coefficient estimates. As mentioned in the Model 1 walkthrough, I defer my analysis and 
interpretation of the results to the VAR Model Results and Interpretation section. 
Step 4 (a) – Diagnostic Tests: I run the same three diagnostic tests (Stata commands: 
[varlmar], [varnorm, jbera], and [varstable] as I did for Model 1 and discuss their 
implications here. First, the Lagrange-Multiplier test shown in Figure 4.10 is similar to the 
one I conducted for Model 1. Again, this time around the p-values at all lag orders aren’t low 
enough and I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation as a result. I can proceed 
with this positive result that the sample of my model doesn’t show enough evidence to reject 
the null of no autocorrelation at all lag orders.  
Figure 4.9: Optimal Lag Length Test Result 
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Second, the output of the Jarque-Bera (JB) test for normality of errors or innovations 
in the VAR model is available in Figure 4.11. The JB test results are not all positive and raise 
a few red flags especially with the Republicans LCV score. This series has low p-values and 
imply a rejection of the null hypothesis which assumes the presence of normally distributed 
errors. There is a positive tone to our results as I cannot reject the null for the rest of my 
variables, and I move on to the last diagnostic test with an awareness of the issues arising 
from the series with non-normally distributed innovations in the model. 
  
Lastly, Figure 4.12 lists the eigenvalues and the modulus for this model and once 
again, Stata tells us that all the eigenvalues are inside the unit circle and the VAR model 
satisfies the stability condition. This concludes the diagnostics for Model 2 and I move onto 
the penultimate step leading up to the results interpretation and discussion section. 
Figure 4.10: Lagrange-multiplier Result 
Figure 4.11: Jarque-Bera test Result 
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Step 4 (b) – Causality Checks: The p-values and t-statistics of individual coefficients in my 
model will be discussed in the next section. The Granger causality test is conducted in the 
same way as Model 1 and the results are displayed in Figure 4.13. The data from the 
causality test is promising as only one of the key explanatory variables (Senate Hearings) has 
a high p-value and I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality. For the rest of 
the included variables, the null hypothesis is rejected and referencing back to the DGP: 
Vector Autoregression section, I know that Granger causality allows econometricians to 
measure whether past values of a series help predict the current value of the key dependent 
variable. For instance, in Figure 4.13 the variables measuring LCV score for Democrats and 
Republicans are said to Granger cause CCSI as their past values help explain the current 
level of the CCSI. As I did for Model 1, the Granger Causality Wald test table gives us 
information to classify the nature of the causality shared between these variables. Table 3 
provides a summary of the different types of causality shared between the 6 key explanatory 
Figure 4.12: Eigenvalues Stability 
Result 
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variables and the CCSI in Model 2. The unidirectional classification for the Senate Hearings 
variable might be confusing, but it’s essentially telling us that CCSI Granger causes Senate 
Hearings. This is an intriguing finding that will be discussed more in the results section. 
Democratic statements, Republican statements, LCV Republicans, and House hearings all 
share a bi-directional causality with CCSI. This classification makes intuitive sense because 
past values of CCSI potentially result in more statements by Democrats and Republicans for 
or against climate change. Similarly, past values of CCSI seem to impact the voting patterns 
of Republicans and the number of House hearings on climate change. Another surprising 
result is the unidirectional causality of LCV Democrats (since CCSI doesn’t Granger cause 
the LCV Democrats score). The optimist might claim this result suggests that the voting 
patterns of Democrats stays consistent regardless of the past levels of climate skepticism in 
the US. While this line of reasoning is fascinating, it is extremely hard to prove or verify 
given the complexity of the model and prematurely stating it as fact might end up in 
committing a type II error.    
 
Figure 4.13: Granger Causality Wald Test Results 
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Finally, I run the third causality check, a Wald test to perform linear hypothesis tests 
of the parameters in the model. Figure 4.14 is a similar collage of all the Wald tests and I can 
immediately notice that these are in sync with the Granger causality results unlike my Model 
1 test results. The test results show that I can reject the null of no causality at a 5% 
significance level for 5 of the 6 explanatory variables. The estimation results and any 
relationships between the Senate hearings variable and the CCSI should be interpreted with 
this awareness due to its unidirectional causality found through the Granger causality tests 
and noncausality result from the Wald tests. 
❖ VAR Model Results and Interpretation 
Before I can begin interpreting the coefficients and drawing inferences from the VAR 
models, I revisit my agenda for the empirical strategy section and contextualize the 
discussions thus far. I broke this agenda down into five stages and have completed the first 
three: building an aggregate-level measure of climate skepticism (CCSI), finding a way to 
combine the CCSI with explanatory variables that represent our thesis (VAR), and assessing 
the quality of these results from the VAR models (pre and post-estimation steps: stationarity, 
autocorrelation, etc.). Technically, I began the fourth stage of interpreting the results when I 
discussed causality in the VAR model walkthrough. Now, I can extract the estimation results 
Figure 4.14: Wald Linear Test Results Collage 
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from both models, interpret the results and critically examine them to answer the key 
questions raised in the paper.  
Recessionary Factors and Climate Skepticism in the US 
In the build-up to the data analysis, I used existing literary findings and empirical research to 
set up a null hypothesis that stated: “Economic indicators of recession (such as 
unemployment rate, declining GDP, etc.) are more likely to heighten the aggregate-level 
climate skepticism in the US”. The Model 1 specification included four variables to estimate 
the influence of economic recessions on climate skepticism. Recession dates is my dummy 
variable that represents quarters officially classified as recession periods between 2000 - 
2015. The Lag 4 coefficient of Recession Dates says that on average, the CCSI is 1.42 
percentage-points lower in the current quarter if the T-4 period (four quarters ago) was 
undergoing a recession (versus a no-recession quarter) holding all other lagged values of 
Recession Dates and lagged values of other included variables constant. The p-value is 
significant at the 5% level so I can reject the null that this result was obtained by chance 
alone. The estimated standard error is small at .007. None of the other lags of Recession 
Dates is statistically significant. The Recession Dates dummy doesn’t provide much evidence 
and I cannot definitively state that an economic recessionary period will predict a significant 
shift in the CCSI. On the contrary, the Lag-4 coefficient suggests that in the aftermath of a 
recessionary quarter, the CCSI is likely to fall by 1.42 percentage-points. This result fails to 
reject the null hypothesis that recessionary economic factors do not heighten the CCSI. 
 Unemployment rate, Real GDP, and the Industrial Production Index have a combined 
total of 3 (out of 12) coefficients that have a statistically significant result that are worth 
considering; Lag 3 of Real GDP, Lag 3 and Lag 4 of IPI. Lag 3 of Real GDP has a coefficient 
of 0.0000648 that is significant at the 5% level and suggests that on average, the CCSI goes 
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up by 0.006 percentage points in the current quarter for a 1% increase in real DGP in the T-3 
period, holding all other included variables and their lags constant. Again, this coefficient 
doesn’t provide much evidence to support the claim that real GDP growth and CCSI might be 
inversely related. The coefficient of Lag 3 of IPI says that on average, the CCSI falls by 1.2 
percentage points in the current period when the IPI goes up by 1% in the T-3 period (or three 
quarters ago) holding all other included variables and lagged values constant. While this 
result may be interesting and suggests that IPI and CCSI are inversely related, my confidence 
is shaky because the result is predicting an outcome based on an extended time period (3 
quarters). But, the Lag-3 coefficient of the IPI does provide some evidence to suggest that I 
can reject the null hypothesis. Moreover, as previously stated, the IPI has a narrower 
definition conceptually when compared to the GDP. The Lag-4 coefficient of IPI is smaller in 
magnitude relative to Lag-3 and the coefficient of 0.009 implies a positive impact on the 
CCSI. Since both these coefficients are highly statistically significant, these results do carry 
causal weight. But the extended timeline of the prediction coupled with inconsistent effects 
across Lags 3 and 4 result in a cautionary approach while rejecting the null hypothesis. 
Before I can comment on the causal links between economic recessionary variables and the 
CCSI, I will refer to the two other causality checks performed in the previous section.  
The Granger Causality tests and Wald tests provide intriguing results that might 
contradict my interpretations of the OLS coefficients. The results of Model 1 might be a good 
example for why experienced econometricians use multiple causality checks and tools to 
determine causal links instead of relying solely on the VAR regression results. The results of 
these supplementary tests suggest that all key explanatory variables, barring the 
unemployment rate, are causally linked to the CCSI. Granted the Granger Causality only 
provides evidence on the direction of causality and not magnitude, the more important 
finding is that Recession Dates, Real GDP, and IPI all Granger cause CCSI. Both the 
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Granger and Wald tests allow me to reject the null that economic recessionary indicators 
aren’t causally linked to the CCSI. While the VAR regressions results were a mixed bag, the 
Granger causality test and Wald test have given me a more definitive result. Rejecting the 
null for both these tests means that the sample suggests there is enough evidence to reject the 
null for the population. These results will be contextualized and given a definitive answer 
with regards to the hypothesis alongside the Model 2 results in the Conclusion section.  
Partisanship / Political Cues and Climate Skepticism 
There is extensive literature specifically regarding the connections between political ideology 
/ partisan values and climate skepticism. In the Applying the Model to CCSI section, I created 
a two-part hypothesis to test claims like these: “opinion on global warming has become 
increasingly polarized across partisan and ideological lines since the 1990s” (McCright & 
Dunlap 2011, 178). The Model 2 specification and our data is capturing a slightly different 
relationship than most papers. The statements made by Democrats and Republicans in 
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VAR Results Table 1 VAR Results Table 2
Key Dependent Variable- 
CCSI Coefficients Standard Errors
Key Dependent Variable- 
CCSI Coefficients Standard Errors
Explanatory Variables Explanatory Variables
Recession Dates Dem. Statements Pro-CC
Lag-1 0.0133 (0.00737) Lag-1 -0.000356 (0.000241)
Lag-2 0.000663 (0.00826) Lag-2 -0.000445 (0.000245)
Lag-3 -0.00980 (0.00790) Lag-3 0.000277 (0.000246)
Lag-4 -0.0142* (0.00724) Lag-4 0.000420 (0.000263)
Unemployment Rate Repub. Statements Anti-CC
Lag-1 -0.271 (0.583) Lag-1 0.000354 (0.000517)
Lag-2 0.161 (0.491) Lag-2 0.000122 (0.000483)
Lag-3 0.236 (0.409) Lag-3 0.00179*** (0.000462)
Lag-4 0.498 (0.465) Lag-4 -0.000749 (0.000573)
Real GDP LCV Dems. CC Voting Score
Lag-1 0.00000533 (0.0000214) Lag-1 0.0654 (0.0712)
Lag-2 -0.0000236 (0.0000264) Lag-2 -0.268** (0.0979)
Lag-3 0.0000648* (0.0000256) Lag-3 0.352** (0.108)
Lag-4 -0.0000351 (0.0000220) Lag-4 -0.217* (0.0994)
IPI LCV Repubs. CC Voting Score
Lag-1 -0.00131 (0.00267) Lag-1 0.217 (0.125)
Lag-2 0.00255 (0.00389) Lag-2 -0.658*** (0.186)
Lag-3 -0.0126** (0.00437) Lag-3 0.308 (0.212)
Lag-4 0.00979*** (0.00284) Lag-4 0.0485 (0.172)
Controls House Hearings on CC
Media Index Lag-1 0.00186*** (0.000488)
Lag-1 -0.0000752 (0.0000432) Lag-2 0.000151 (0.000532)
Lag-2 -0.0000159 (0.0000525) Lag-3 -0.0000847 (0.000470)
Lag-3 0.000102* (0.0000500) Lag-4 0.0000640 (0.000409)
Lag-4 0.0000811* (0.0000402) Senate Hearings on CC
Scientific Reports on CC Lag-1 -0.000575 (0.000637)
Lag-1 -0.000315 (0.00331) Lag-2 -0.000765 (0.000709)
Lag-2 -0.00426 (0.00355) Lag-3 -0.000872 (0.000631)
Lag-3 0.00174 (0.00349) Lag-4 0.000327 (0.000590)
Lag-4 0.00383 (0.00364) Controls
CEI US (%) Very Warm Areas
Lag-1 -0.0346 (0.0198) Lag-1 -0.00742 (0.0158)
Lag-2 -0.0336 (0.0203) Lag-2 0.0387* (0.0152)
Lag-3 -0.0389 (0.0214) Lag-3 -0.00256 (0.0139)
Lag-4 -0.0713** (0.0230) Lag-4 -0.000636 (0.0133)
CCSI Scientific Reports on CC
Lag-1 0.472*** (0.119) Lag-1 -0.00163 (0.00326)
Lag-2 0.0130 (0.131) Lag-2 0.00154 (0.00340)
Lag-3 -0.107 (0.158) Lag-3 0.00655* (0.00309)






constant: 0.129 (0.0994) constant: 0.121 (0.0623)
Sample Time: 2001 Q1 - 2015 Q4 Sample Time: 2001 Q1 - 2015 Q4
Observations: 60 Observations: 60
R
2
 : 0.9522 R
2
 : 0.9439
Standard errors in parentheses Standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001  *p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001
Model 1 Model 2
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individuals with party affiliations. Since my CCSI is built using survey polls, it’s likely that 
these individuals are the ones that hold these climate change beliefs which are classified as 
skeptical. The VAR model is intended to capture how these political “elites” that represent 
common interests in Congress can potentially predict the level of the CCSI at a given time. 
The two-part hypothesis suggested that: “Pro-climate change statements and voting patterns 
of Democratic Congresspersons are more likely to lower the aggregate-level climate 
skepticism in the US” and “Anti-climate change statements and voting patterns of Republican 
Congresspersons are more likely to raise the aggregate-level climate skepticism in the US”.  
 The first of my six explanatory variables in Table 2 is the pro-climate change 
statements made by Democrats (Stata label: DemsStatmnts) in Congress. None of the Lags of 
DemsStatmnts are statistically significant and thus these results don’t provide much evidence 
in support of my hypothesis. The second variable is the anti-climate change statements made 
by Republicans in Congress (Stata label: RepubStatmnts). The only lagged value that is 
statistically significant here is Lag 3. The 0.0017 coefficient might appear to be relatively low 
magnitude but it suggests that on average, the CCSI goes up by .17 percentage points in the 
current quarter if the anti-climate change statement made by a Republican Congressperson 
increased by 1 in the T-3 period (3 quarters ago) holding all other variables and their lagged 
values constant. This result is consistent with the hypothesis and since it is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, I can reject the null hypothesis that Republican anti-climate 
change statements do not impact the CCSI. Thus, I can state that while pro-climate change 
statements made by Democrats aren’t statistically significant, anti-climate change statements 
made by Republicans in Congress are effective and causally linked to the CCSI.  
 Before skipping to the LCV scores, I take a quick look at the House and Senate 
hearings. The House and Senate hearings were included to test the “political cues” aspect of 
the hypothesis and a quick glance at the respective coefficients shows that only Lag 1 of the 
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House hearings on climate change had a statistically significant result. This coefficient 
suggests that House hearings and CCSI are positively related and I can reject the null of no 
relationship between House hearings and CCSI for Lag-1. Finally, the last couple of 
explanatory variables are the LCV scores of Democrats and Republicans. To reiterate, the 
LCV scores are an aggregated average of individual Democrats (or Republicans) scores based 
on their votes for or against specific climate change related legislations in the House and 
Senate. A higher score indicates a voting pattern that is supportive of climate change action. 
For the LCV score of Democrats (Stata label: LCVDems), Lags 2 and 3 are highly 
statistically significant (at the 1% level) results. The Lag 2 coefficient of LCVDems tells us 
that on average, the CCSI falls by approximately 26 percentage points in the current period 
for a 1 percentage point increase in the LCV score in the T-2 period (2 quarters ago) holding 
all lagged values of LCVDems and other included variables constant. This is an intriguing 
finding and instantly demands further exploration. The estimated standard error is large and 
suggests that there is a high margin of error for this estimate. Barring the high estimated SE, 
my confidence in this result grows due to the postestimation causality checks mentioned 
previously. The Granger causality tests discussed in the previous section indicate that 
LCVDems Granger causes the CCSI. The Wald tests provided a similar result as the low p-
value implies that I can confidently reject the null of no causality for LCVDems.  
Lags 3 and 4 for LCVDems both produce significant results but the positive effect in 
Lag 3 raises a concern. Does the sign change imply a reverse effect compared to the other 
two lags? Without any further information or specialized knowledge about the complications 
of sign switching, I am forced to interpret it as a reactionary contradicting effect due to 
factors that isn’t completely knowable over the T-3 extended timeline. Again, this goes 
beyond the scope of the thesis and is nothing beyond an educated guess. The Lag 3 
coefficient implies an average positive effect of 35 percentage-points on the CCSI in the 
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current quarter for a 1% increase in LCVDems in the T-2 period, holding all other variables 
constant. The Lag 4 coefficient implies the same negative effect as Lag 2, but slightly lower 
at 21 percentage-points, for the T-4 period.  
 The last explanatory variable for Model 2 is the LCV score of Republicans 
(LCVRepubs) and only both Lag-2 produces statistically significant results. The coefficient 
of Lag 2 is perhaps the most fascinating result of the model as it implies that on average the 
CCSI falls by 65 percentage-points in the current quarter for a 1%-point increase in 
LCVRepubs in the T-2 period, holding all other variables and their lags constant. While this 
result is significant at the 0.001 level, implying a one in a thousand chance of being wrong, 
the high estimated SE and the non-normally distributed errors (see JB test result) induce some 
caution about the magnitude of the effect. Regardless, the Lag-2 coefficient suggests a strong 
causal link between voting patterns of Republican Congresspersons and the CCSI. The 
Granger Causality and Wald tests produce consistent findings and further my conviction 
about a causal link between the Republican LCV scores and CCSI.   
 The VAR Model Results and Interpretation section broadly discussed the magnitude 
and causality of all my explanatory variables but didn’t tie these results back to the initial 
hypotheses. Table 3 is an attempt to consolidate the results of the three causality checks 
across both models for the key explanatory variables. In the next section, I will attempt to 
contextualize the vast information available in the two models, explain the results in tandem 
to the hypothesis tests, and provide a final answer to the main research question.  
 Despite multiple theoretical predictions and discussions of causal connections 
between economic recessions and CCSI, I only found a few meaningful connections in the 
model. A few important things to note are that the sample size for Model 1 only possesses 
two periods of extended recessionary effects. This might have lowered the probability of 
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sniffing out any trends and patterns in the CCSI using a model specified with recessionary 
indicators. Furthermore, both models didn’t include all the control series available in the 
dataset since the resulting VAR model failed diagnostic tests and rendered unreliable 
estimates. In the final few sections, I briefly discuss the economic and political significance 
of my findings and suggest a few avenues for further research on this fascinating topic.  










Causality Check Summary Causality Check Summary
Explanatory Variables
Test #1: OLS 
P-Values
Test #2: Granger 
Causality Test #3: Wald Explanatory Variables
Test #1: OLS 
P-Values
Test #2: Granger 
Causality Test #3: Wald
Recession Dates ✓
























Lag 2 (P < 0.01)
Lag 3 (P < 0.01)







Lag 3 (P < 0.01)





LCV Repubs. Score ✓











Note: All Causality Tests Results summarized from Granger Causality Tests
Senate Hearings X X X
Model 1 Model 2
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The famed theoretical physicist, Albert Einstein once said: “The grand aim of all science is to 
cover the greatest number of empirical facts by logical deduction from the smallest possible 
number of hypotheses or axioms” (“Albert Einstein”, 2016). Obviously, I’m not a scientist 
and this paper doesn’t talk about the theory of relativity. But my empirical strategy renders 
countless small and large-scale findings while attempting to answer a question based on two 
broad hypotheses. I’ll aim for a conclusion that is succinct and gathers the key findings from 
the Empirical Strategy section, that is nothing short of an abyss filled with information.  
 First, I’ll consider the VAR regression results from Table 1 of the Main VAR 
Regression Results and the summary of the causality checks for Model 1 in Table 3 to prove 
or disprove Hypothesis 1. The three causality checks for the four chosen explanatory 
variables, clearly indicates a trend and a potential relationship between recessionary factors 
and CCSI. The only variable that fails to show any significant result whatsoever is 
unemployment rate. Results from IPI provide the best claim to establish a causal link with the 
CCSI. The IPI variables has multiple lags (3 and 4) with highly statistically significant results 
across the three causality checks that give me enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis of 
no causality. The low p-values suggests the likelihood of my dataset given a true null 
hypothesis; i.e. economic recessionary factors do not explain an increase in the CCSI. 
Referring to Table 3 again, I can reject this null for both the Recession Dates and the Real 
GDP as well since these variables produce consistent results across the three causality checks 
but at a lower level of significance compared to the IPI. For Hypothesis 1, I find a positive 
result with some mixed information but find evidence to reject the null that economic 
recessions don’t explain an upward trend in CCSI. 
Back to Contents 
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 Next, let’s turn to the VAR regression results for Model 2 in Table 2 of the Main VAR 
Regression Results and the summary of the causality checks in Table 3 in order to prove or 
disprove the Hypothesis 2 (a & b). The null hypothesis for 2 (a) states that pro-climate 
change statements and voting patterns of Democratic Congresspersons has no impact on 
lowering the CCSI. The Democratic statements variable produces mixed results since the 
regression doesn’t provide any lags with significant results and the p-values for Granger 
Causality and Wald tests are significant at the 5% level. Based on this mixed result, I don’t 
find enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Next, the LCV Dems variable, 
representing Democrats’ voting patterns, has three coefficients at lags 1, 2, and 3 that are 
statistically significant, and their magnitude indicates a strong negative relation with the 
CCSI. Since, the other two causality checks give consistent statistically significant results, 
there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Again, the low p-values for LCV Dems 
across all causality checks suggest my sample provides enough evidence to reject the null for 
the target population (U.S. public). For Hypothesis 2 (a), I find a mixed result where I have 
little confidence to reject the null that pro-climate change statements made by Democrats 
don’t explain a negative trend in CCSI, but find enough evidence to reject the null that pro-
climate change voting patterns of Democrats don’t explain a fall in the CCSI.  
 Finally, I can use the same results from Model 2 to test the null hypothesis of 2 (b) 
which states that anti-climate change statements have no impact on raising the CCSI and pro-
climate change voting patterns of Republican Congresspersons has no impact on lowering the 
CCSI. The Lag 3 coefficient of Republican statement is highly statistically significant (p< 
0.001) and positively affects the CCSI. Moreover, the causality checks indicate consistent 
results across all tests, and this is sufficient evidence to reject the null. Lastly, the LCV 
Republicans score will help understand the existence of any causal effects between voting 
patterns of Republican Congresspersons and the CCSI. Table 3 clearly indicates that all three 
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causality checks produce statistically significant results, and this is enough evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis. A key observation from the Model Results and Interpretation pertained to 
the magnitude and direction of causality for the Lag-2 coefficient of LCV Republicans. The 
negative effect might seem confusing, but it makes sense since the LCV score allots higher 
scores for pro-climate change voting patterns. One interpretation is that a higher LCV score 
for Republicans is more effective in lowering the CCSI than a higher LCV score for 
Democrats. For Hypothesis 2 (b), I find a consistent result where I can reject the null that 
anti-climate change statements made by Republican elites don’t explain a positive trend in 
CCSI, and also find enough evidence to reject the null that pro-climate change voting 
patterns of Republicans don’t explain a fall in the CCSI. 
Main Takeaways: Before I answer the main research question, here is a shortlist of insights 
and empirical results that I find the most intriguing: 
1. I initially expected more evidence from the Recession Dates and Unemployment Rate 
variables. But it was IPI, with relevant coefficients, that helps explain the variance of the 
CCSI and bolster the case for a causal link between economic recessions and climate 
skepticism.  
2. House hearings share a causal link with the CCSI and are more relevant in explaining the 
variance in the CCSI than Senate hearings. The bidirectional causality for House 
Hearings and CCSI (Table 3) implies that there is evidence to suggest that higher levels 
of CCSI has a causal impact on the number of house hearings too.       
3. Republican anti-climate change statements share a more consistent causal link with the 
CCSI than Democratic pro-climate change statements (Table 3). One potential theory 
why this might be the case is because the data used to construct the CCSI comprises of 
skeptical public responses belonging to people from conservative backgrounds or identify 
as Republican. 
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4. The unidirectional causality of LCV Democrats suggests that changes in CCSI do not 
influence the voting patterns of Democrats. Contrary to political statements, voting 
patterns of Democrats and Republicans are equally influential in explaining the CCSI. 
The higher magnitude impact in mean changes of the CCSI with respect to LCV 
Republicans suggests that pro-climate change voting from Republicans is more effective, 
since it might elicit a stronger decline in CCSI compared to Democrats’ voting patterns.  
Final Answer to Research Question 
Given the target time period of Q1 2000 to Q4 2015, the key decisions made to compute the 
CCSI, and including/excluding variables to represent recessions and partisanship, there is 
some evidence to back the claim that economic recessions explain climate skepticism. But, 
the VAR results for Model 1 do not show consistent patterns and strong effects across all 
recession variables. The VAR results from Model 2 identify a more systematic pattern with a 
larger magnitude impact on the CCSI. Thus partisanship, represented through the lens of 
political elite cues, emerges as a clear winner in explaining the variance and movement in 
aggregate-level climate skepticism in the U.S.  
Avenues for further research    
While there are many creative ways one could extend this thesis or reframe the research 
question, two potential areas that could be interesting for further research are: 
1. Studying interaction effects and analyzing the CCSI with greater context on the 
demographics of the underlying population. One way to do this might be to build 
state-wise CCSI based on local and state survey questions and running data analysis 
on these aggregates, but more focused measures of climate skepticism. 
2. Introducing an element of forecasting which uses the VAR regression results to make 
predictions of possible influencers of climate skepticism. This could help with public 
policy recommendation and can refocus the problem of climate skepticism from an 
“agnotology” perspective.  
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4. Empirical Strategy - DGP: Climate Change Skeptic Index 




























S.No Variable Name Date




51 USPSR 2/28/2006 6 2000
52 USPSRAAAAA 2/28/2006 24 2000
53 USPSRA7 2/28/2006 18 2000
54 USPSRA8 2/28/2006 26 2000
55 GallupPersonalWorry 3/5/2006 5 72000
56 GallupClimateWorry 3/5/2006 15 72000
57 GallupGWEffects 3/5/2006 8 72000
58 GallupGWNews 3/5/2006 30 72000
59 GallupGWHumanActs 3/5/2006 36 72000
60 GallupGWScientists 3/15/2006 3 72000
61 USCBSNYT 5/9/2006 30 1241
62 USCBSNYTTT 5/9/2006 6 1241
63 USIPSOSRR 12/22/2006 9 1000
64 USNBCWSJ 1/29/2007 33 1007
65 GallupPersonalWorry 3/5/2007 6 72000
66 GallupClimateWorry 3/5/2007 16 72000
67 GallupGWEffects 3/5/2007 8 72000
68 GallupGWNews 3/5/2007 33 72000
69 GallupGWHumanActs 3/5/2007 35 72000
70 USGALLUP 4/19/2007 26 1007
71 USGALLUPP 4/19/2007 30 1007
72 USCBSNYT 4/26/2007 12 1052
73 USCBSNYTT 4/26/2007 20 1052
74 USCBSNYTTT 4/26/2007 3 1052
75 USCBSNY 4/26/2007 9 1052
76 USCBSNYTTTT 4/26/2007 9 1052
77 USORCCC 5/9/2007 19 1028
78 USORC 5/31/2007 42 1028
79 USIPSOSR 6/30/2007 7 1001
80 USICR 7/1/2007 20 2140
81 USPSRNEW 8/31/2007 39 1002
82 USPSRNEW1 8/31/2007 42 1002
83 USPSRNEW2 8/31/2007 10 1002
84 USPSRNEW3 8/31/2007 42 1002
85 USPSRNEW4 8/31/2007 13 1002
86 USPSRNEW5 8/31/2007 17 1002
87 USPSRNEW6 8/31/2007 18 1002
88 USPSRNEW7 8/31/2007 17 1002
89 USIPSOSR 9/26/2007 20 1001
90 USCBS 10/18/2007 15 1282
91 USCBSNYT 12/31/2007 15 1133
92 GallupPersonalWorry 3/5/2008 7 72000
93 GallupClimateWorry 3/5/2008 17 72000
94 GallupGWEffects 3/5/2008 11 72000
95 GallupGWNews 3/5/2008 35 72000
96 GallupGWScientists 3/5/2008 7 72000
97 GallupGWHumanActs 3/5/2008 38 72000
98 USSRBI 5/8/2008 24 1502
99 USORC 6/6/2008 45 1035
100 USPSRNEW8 6/20/2008 19 1010
S.No Variable Name Date
Summary Score  
(% Sceptic) Sample Size
1 GallupClimateWorry 4/9/2000 12 72000
2 GallupSeriousness 12/31/2000 30 72000
3 GallupPersonalWorry 3/5/2001 5 72000
4 GallupClimateWorry 3/5/2001 13 72000
5 GallupGWEffects 3/5/2001 7 72000
6 GallupGWNews 3/5/2001 30 72000
7 GallupGWScientists 3/5/2001 4 72000
8 USPSRA 4/26/2001 14 1202
9 USPS 4/26/2001 25 1202
10 USGALLU 6/1/2001 40 1011
11 USCBSNYT 6/20/2001 17 1050
12 USCBSNYTT 6/20/2001 22 1050
13 USCBSNT 6/20/2001 32 1050
14 USPSRAA 10/24/2001 13 1281
15 GallupPersonalWorry 3/5/2002 6 72000
16 GallupClimateWorry 3/5/2002 17 72000
17 GallupGWEffects 3/5/2002 9 72000
18 GallupGWNews 3/5/2002 31 72000
19 USWASHP 7/8/2002 19 1402
20 GallupPersonalWorry 3/5/2003 10 72000
21 GallupClimateWorry 3/5/2003 17 72000
22 GallupGWEffects 3/5/2003 10 72000
23 GallupGWNews 3/5/2003 33 72000
24 GallupGWHumanActs 3/5/2003 33 72000
25 GallupPersonalWorry 3/5/2004 7 72000
26 GallupClimateWorry 3/5/2004 19 72000
27 GallupGWEffects 3/5/2004 11 72000
28 GallupGWNews 3/5/2004 38 72000
29 USGREEN 4/13/2004 10 1610
30 USUMARY 6/25/2004 23 753
31 USUMARY1 6/25/2004 54 753
32 USUMARY2 6/25/2004 19 753
33 USUMARY3 6/25/2004 29 753
34 USUMARY4 6/25/2004 30 753
35 USPSRAA 8/18/2004 12 2009
36 GallupSeriousness 12/31/2004 38 72000
37 USUMARY5 1/18/2005 29 801
38 GallupPersonalWorry 3/5/2005 6 72000
39 GallupGWEffects 3/5/2005 9 72000
40 GallupGWNews 3/5/2005 31 72000
41 USUMARY 7/5/2005 21 812
42 USUMARY1 7/5/2005 44 812
43 USUMARY6 7/5/2005 28 812
44 USUMARY7 7/5/2005 6 812
45 USUMARY8 7/5/2005 13 812
46 USUMARY9 7/5/2005 28 812
47 USPSRAA 11/17/2005 10 2006
48 USABCWPPP 1/29/2006 35 1002
49 USPSRAAA 2/28/2006 8 2000
50 USPSRAAAA 2/28/2006 14 2000
Back to Contents 
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S.No Variable Name Date




101 USSRBI3 8/5/2008 18 1502
102 USABCWPPPP 12/20/2008 20 1003
103 USCBS 2/28/2009 22 864
104 USCBSSS 2/28/2009 32 864
105 GallupPersonalWorry 3/5/2009 7 72000
106 GallupClimateWorry 3/5/2009 20 72000
107 GallupGWEffects 3/5/2009 16 72000
108 GallupGWNews 3/5/2009 41 72000
109 USPAF 4/3/2009 27 1001
110 USPAFF 4/3/2009 37 1001
111 USPAFFF 4/3/2009 9 1001
112 USPAFFFF 4/3/2009 12 1001
113 USORCC 5/5/2009 17 2019
114 USPSRA6 7/9/2009 13 2001
115 USSRBI 10/22/2009 32 1500
116 USSRBI1 10/22/2009 5 1500
117 USSRBI 10/31/2009 32 1500
118 USABCWP 11/24/2009 17 1001
119 USSRBI2 12/3/2009 51 2000
120 USORC 12/7/2009 54 1041
121 USORCCCC 12/7/2009 24 1041
122 USCBSNY 12/14/2009 27 1031
123 USABCWPP 12/18/2009 62 1003
124 USABCWPPPPP 12/18/2009 29 1003
125 GallupPersonalWorry 3/5/2010 7 72000
126 GallupClimateWorry 3/5/2010 29 72000
127 GallupGWEffects 3/5/2010 19 72000
128 GallupGWNews 3/5/2010 48 72000
129 GallupGWScientists 3/5/2010 10 72000
130 GallupGWHumanActs 3/5/2010 46 72000
131 USCBSNYT 4/14/2010 29 1580
132 USVIRGCU 5/27/2010 42 1001
133 USVIRGCU1 5/27/2010 45 1001
134 USVIRGCU2 5/27/2010 49 1001
135 USGALLUPPP 6/30/2010 20 1014
136 USCBS 8/31/2010 26 847
137 USCBS 10/31/2010 25 1253
138 GallupSeriousness 12/31/2010 48 72000
139 GallupPersonalWorry 3/5/2011 7 72000
140 GallupClimateWorry 3/5/2011 28 72000
S.No Variable Name Date




141 GallupGWEffects 3/5/2011 18 72000
142 GallupGWNews 3/5/2011 43 72000
143 GallupGWScientists 3/5/2011 8 72000
144 GallupGWHumanActs 3/5/2011 43 72000
145 USCBS 4/30/2011 21 1021
146 USORC 9/15/2011 51 1038
147 USCBSNY 9/16/2011 12 1566
148 GallupPersonalWorry 3/5/2012 7 72000
149 GallupClimateWorry 3/5/2012 23 72000
150 GallupGWEffects 3/5/2012 15 72000
151 GallupGWNews 3/5/2012 42 72000
152 GallupGWScientists 3/5/2012 7 72000
153 GallupGWHumanActs 3/5/2012 41 72000
154 USCBSNYT 6/30/2012 27 990
155 USCBSNYT 6/30/2012 25 990
156 USCBSS 10/31/2012 9 1132
157 USPRRI 12/13/2012 34 1018
158 USORC 1/31/2013 47 814
159 USCBSS 1/31/2013 10 1052
160 GallupPersonalWorry 3/5/2013 8 72000
161 GallupClimateWorry 3/5/2013 23 72000
162 GallupGWEffects 3/5/2013 15 72000
163 GallupGWNews 3/5/2013 41 72000
164 GallupGWScientists 3/5/2013 6 72000
165 GallupGWHumanActs 3/5/2013 39 72000
166 GallupGWNatural 3/10/2013 40 72000
167 USCBS 4/30/2013 21 977
168 USCBS 4/30/2013 15 977
169 USCBSS 4/30/2013 10 977
170 USCBSS 4/30/2013 8 977
171 GallupSeriousness 12/31/2013 41 72000
172 YPCCCtaxdividendOppose 2/15/2014 24 13000
173 YPCCCCO2limitsOppose 2/15/2014 34 13000
174 YPCCCregulateOppose 2/15/2014 23 13000
175 GallupPersonalWorry 3/5/2014 10 72000
176 GallupClimateWorry 3/5/2014 24 72000
177 GallupGWEffects 3/5/2014 18 72000
178 GallupGWNews 3/5/2014 42 72000
179 GallupGWScientists 3/5/2014 8 72000
180 GallupGWHumanActs 3/5/2014 40 72000
181 GallupPersonalWorry 3/5/2015 10 72000
182 GallupClimateWorry 3/5/2015 24 72000
183 GallupGWEffects 3/5/2015 16 72000
184 GallupGWNews 3/5/2015 42 72000
185 GallupGWScientists 3/5/2015 8 72000
186 GallupGWHumanActs 3/5/2015 41 72000
187 GallupSeriousness 12/31/2015 42 72000
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Table S2: CCSI Iteration History (Provided by WCALC) 
 
 














Dimension 1 Information: 
Eigen Estimate: 1.53 of possible 1.89 
Percentage Variance Explained: 80.73 










Iteration Convergence Criterion Items Reliability AlphaA AlphaB
1 0.2296 0.001 19 0.616 0.568 0.656
2 0.021 0.001 19 0.715 0.501 0.659
3 0.0037 0.001 19 0.72 0.501 0.663









1 GallupClimateWorry 15 0.98 19.8 5.009
2 GallupSeriousness 4 0.99 39.25 6.457
3 GallupPersonalWorry 15 0.435 7.2 1.6
4 GallupGWEffects 15 0.952 12.667 4.044
5 GallupGWNews 15 0.967 37.333 5.594
6 GallupGWScientists 9 0.911 6.778 2.043
7 USCBSNYT 6 0.774 21.5 7.089
8 USCBSNYTT 2 -1 21 1
9 USPSRAA 3 0.967 11.667 1.247
10 GallupGWHumanActs 10 0.915 39.2 3.682
11 USUMARY 2 1 22 1
12 USUMARY1 2 1 49 5
13 USCBSNYTTT 2 1 4.5 1.5
14 USCBSNY 3 0.809 16 7.874
15 USORC 5 0.999 47.8 4.261
16 USIPSOSR 2 1 13.5 6.5
17 USCBS 6 0.948 21.167 3.804
18 USSRBI 2 1 28 4
19 USCBSS 3 0.88 9.333 0.471
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Table S4: Descriptive Statistics of Data Used in Analysis 
  
Table S5: Survey Questions Used in Construction of CCSI (by WCALC) 
Full Question Text Variable Name Dates Administered Source 
I'm going to read you a list of environmental problems. 
As I read each one, please tell me if you personally 
worry about this problem a great deal, a fair amount, 
only a little or not at all. First, how much do you 
personally worry about: Global Warming & Climate 
Change 
GallupClimateWorry April 2000, March: 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 




Is the seriousness of global warming generally 
exaggerated, generally correct, generally 
underestimated? 




Next, I'm going to read a list of problems facing the 
country. For each one, please tell me if you personally 
worry about this problem a great deal, a fair amount, 
only a little or not at all? How much do you personally 
worry about the quality of the environment? 
GallupPersonalWorry March: 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 




Variables Measures Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
CCSI 23.62745 3.83207 16.669 32.154
Recession Dates 0.15625 0.3659625 0 1
Unemployment Rate 6.35938 1.80271 4 10
Real GDP (constant 2012) 15205.02 1257.655 12924.18 17456.22
Industrial Production Index 98.04934 4.911275 87.5984 106.3359
Total Nonfarm Payrolls 134279.6 3550.869 129804 143125
Price of Oil 2.5604 0.82998 1.1973 3.901
Democrat Pro-CC 
Statements 10.4375 11.3667 0 43
Republican Anti-CC 
Statements 3.6875 7.285286 0 35
LCV Democrats Score 84.60453 4.75323 75.14231 93.24028
LCV Republicans Score 12.55761 4.34647 3.80359 18.02133
House Hearings on CC 6.265625 6.69338 0 32
Senate Hearings on CC 4.78125 4.968053 0 22
US % Warm Areas 19.47042 11.80179 1.14 46.56
US % Cold Areas 4.1663 6.41102 0 35.13667
Climate Extremes Index 21.33281 7.67746 8.58 45.26
Drought Levels 109.9875 37.20504 39.76923 207.3077
Media Coverage Index 115.3125 54.84549 31 314
Environmental Magazines 11.46875 5.887756 2 27
Conservative Magazines 4.40625 3.910583 0 20
Science Magazines 78.45313 37.19273 23 163
Release of Major Scientific 




















Which of the following statements reflects your view of 
when the effects of global warming will begin to happen 
-- they have already begun to happen, they will start 
happening within a few years, they will start happening 
within your lifetime, they will not happen within your 
lifetime, but they will affect future generations (or) they 
will never happen? 
GallupGWEffects March: 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 




Thinking about what is said in the news, in your view is 
the seriousness of global warming --generally 
exaggerated, generally correct or is it generally 
underestimated? 
GallupGWNews March: 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 




Just your impression, which one of the following 
statements do you think is most accurate -- most 
scientists believe that global warming is occurring, most 
scientists believe that global warming is NOT occurring 
or most scientists are unsure about whether global 
warming is occurring or not? 
GallupGWScientists March 2001, 2006, 2008, 




Do you think global warming is an environmental 
problem that is causing a serious impact now, or do you 
think the impact of global warming won't happen until 
sometime in the future, or do you think global warming 
won't have a serious impact at all? 
USCBSNYT June 2001, April 2007, 
December 2007, April 




Do you think it is necessary to take steps to counter the 
effects of global warming right away, or isn't it 
necessary to take steps yet? 
USCBSNYTT June 2001 and April 2007 CBS News/New 
York Times 
(As I read a list of possible long-range foreign policy 
goals which the United States might have, tell me how 
much priority you think each should be given. Do you 
think this should have top priority, some priority, or no 
priority at all?)... Dealing with global warming 
USPSRAA October 2001, August 





And from what you have heard or read, do you believe 
increases in the Earth's temperature over the last century 
are due more to -- the effects of pollution from human 
activities (or) natural changes in the environment that 
are not due to human activities? 
GallupGWHumanActs March: 2003, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014, 2015 
Gallup 
Organization 
There is a controversy over what the countries of the 
world, including the US (United States), should do about 
the problem of global warming.  I'm going to read you 
three statements.  Please tell me which statements comes 
closest to your own point of view....Until we are sure 
that global warming, is really a problem we should not 
take any steps that would have economic costs.  The 
problem of global warming should be addressed, but its 
effects will be gradual, so we can deal with the problem 
gradually by taking steps that are low in cost.  Global 
warming is a serious and pressing problem.  We should 
begin taking steps now even if this involves significant 
costs. 





Which of the following statements is closest to your 
own opinion?...There is a consensus among the great 
majority of scientists that global warming exists and 
could do significant damage.  There is a consensus 
among the great majority of scientists that global 
warming does not exist and therefore poses no 
significant threat.  Scientists are divided on the existence 
of global warming and its impact. 





Global warming is a term used to describe changes in 
the temperature of the earth's atmosphere which could 
result in changes in the environment.  How much have 
you heard or read about global warming--a lot, some, 
not much or nothing at all? 
USCBSNYTTT May 2006, April 2007,  CBS News/New 
York Times 
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Which comes closer to your view?...Global warming is a 
very serious problem and should be one of the highest 
priorities for government leaders.  Global warming is 
serious but does not need to be a high priority.  Global 
warming is not serious and can be addressed years from 
now. 
USCBSNY April 2007, December 
2009, September 2011 
CBS News/New 
York Times 
Which of the following statements come closest to your 
view of global warming?...Global warming is a proven 
fact and is mostly caused by emissions from cars and 
industrial facilities such as power plants and factories.  
Global warming is a proven fact and is mostly caused by 
natural changes that have nothing to do with emissions 
from cars and industrial facilities.  Global warming is a 
theory that has not yet been proven. 
USORC May 2007, June 2008, 
December 2009, 




If nothing is done to reduce global warming in the 
future, how serious of a problem do you think it will be 
for the world?...Very serious, somewhat serious, not so 
serious, not serious at all 




Do you think global warming is an environmental 
problem that is causing a serious impact now, or do you 
think the impact of global warming won't happen until 
sometime in the future, or do you think global warming 
won't have a serious impact at all? 
USCBS October 2007, February 
2009, August 2010, 
October 2010, April 2011, 
April 2013 
CBS News 
In your view, is global warming a very serious problem, 
somewhat serious, not too serious, or not a problem? 
USSRBI May 2008, October 2009 Abt SRBI 
Which statement comes closest to your view about 
global warming?...Global warming is caused mostly by 
human activity such as burning fossil fuels.  Global 
warming is caused mostly by natural patterns in the 
earth's environment.  Global warming does not exist. 
USCBSS October 2012, January 




NOTE: A summary of all the variable data used in the VAR analysis is available in the 


















Applying the Model to CCSI 
Detailed Information on Variable Sources and Recoding 
1. Economic Recessionary Data: 6 measures of economic recession indicators are used in the 
thesis. This category of data was easy to find as the St. Louis FRED Economic Research 
website hosted all this information and I downloaded quarterly data for the desired time 
period (Q1 2000 – Q4 2015). Data can be found at: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ 
2. Partisanship/Political Elite Cues: 6 measures of partisanship were included in the model 
and I followed the same steps as Brulle (2012). The sources and recoding information of 
these variables is borrowed from Brulle (2012) Supplementary Information since they are 
exactly replicated for my thesis:- 
• Congressional action statements on climate change issued by Republicans and 
Democrats identified by a keyword search of Lexis-Nexis Congressional (Sellers 2010: 
79-80).  Each statement was coded as either supporting, opposing, or neutral regarding 
Congressional legislative action to address climate change. 
• Number of Congressional hearings on climate change reported in the Proquest 
Congressional Data Base (3/1/2019) under "Global Climate Change," "Greenhouse 
Effect," “CO2” and "Carbon Dioxide." 
• Senate and House roll call votes on climate change bills identified in the League of 
Conservation Voters National Environmental Scorecard (see Lindaman and Haider-
Markel 2002: 97). Data can be found online at: http://scorecard.lcv.org/scorecard?year=all 
3. Controls – Extreme Weather Data: 4 measures of extreme weather as measured by drought 
levels, percentage of warm and cold areas, and an overall extreme weather index were 
compiled using the same strategy suggested by Brulle (2012). The recoding description is 
again borrowed from Brulle (2012) Supplementary Information:- 
• Overall Climate Extremes Index – arithmetic average of six indicators of climatic 
extremes across the U.S. Data can be found online at: 
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/extremes/cei/graph 
• Extremes in Maximum Temperature % of U.S. with maximum temperatures much 
above normal. Data can be found online at: https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-
precip/uspa/ 
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• Drought Levels - % of U.S. in severe drought based on the Palmer Drought Severity 
Index. Data can be found online at: 
https://www.drought.gov/drought/search/data?f%5B0%5D=field_data_coverage%3A157 
4. Controls - Media Coverage & Advocacy: 3 measures of media coverage and advocacy 
were built using strategies recommended in Brulle (2012). The recoding information and 
description are partly borrowed from Brulle (2012) Supplementary Information: 
• The Media Coverage Index is an additive index (alpha=0.649) used to represent 
media coverage on climate change. The Index is based on three types of media 
sources (TV, Newspaper, & Magazines): 
o Number of stories on climate change on the nightly news shows of the major 
broadcast TV networks (NBC, CBS, ABC) based on a Boolean keyword 
search of the Vanderbilt Television Archives using "global warming," "climate 
change," “greenhouse” and "sea level". Data can be found online at: 
https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/ 
o Number of stories on climate change in the New York Times - The count of 
stories on climate change in the NY Times was collected by a Lexis-Nexis 
Academic Search using the same set of keywords as above. 
o Number of stories on climate change in the three major weekly magazine 
stories (Newsweek, Time, and USA Today) - gathered using “Readers' Guide 
Full Text Select (H.W. Wilson)”, access provided by DePauw libraries. The 
search was again made using the following terms:  "climate change" or "global 
warming" or greenhouse or "atmospheric carbon dioxide".  
• Number of stories on climate change in 7 major environmental magazines (listed 
below) - gathered from “Readers' Guide Full Text Select (H.W. Wilson)”, access 
provided by DePauw libraries. Search was made using the following terms:  "climate 
change" or "global warming" or greenhouse or "atmospheric carbon dioxide". The 7 
environmental magazines are: American Forests, E: The Environmental Magazine, 
Environment, National Parks, Oceanus, Sierra, and The Mother Earth News. 
• Number of stories on climate change in 4 major conservative (listed below) - gathered 
from “Readers' Guide Full Text Select (H.W. Wilson)”. Search was made on the 
following terms:  "climate change" or "global warming" or greenhouse or 
"atmospheric carbon dioxide". The magazines are: Human Events, National Review, 
Reason, and The American Spectator.  
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5. Controls - Scientific Information: 2 measures of scientific information were used based 
on recommendations from Brulle (2012) again. These are: 
• Count of articles in different types of scientific outlets including: Magazines, 
Academic Journals, Biographies, and Peer-Reviewed Articles. The search phrases 
used were: “global warming” OR “climate change” OR greenhouse”. Used the 
same source as Media advocacy: Reader's Guide Full Text Select (H.W. Wilson). 
• Release of major climate change assessment reports - The release of major climate 
change assessment reports scored as a dummy variable (yes = 1) for the quarters 
in which a report was released.  The following reports were included: 1) 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Reports (varies years), 2) US 
Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), and 3) the America’s Climate 
Choices report released by the NRC. Data for IPCC can be found at: 
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These are all the results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller tests for both Model 1 and Model 2 






Figure S1: Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests for 
Model 1 
*not showing ADF tests at first differences for 
nonstationary variables 
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Figure S2: Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests for 
Model 2 
*not showing ADF tests at first differences for 
nonstationary variables 
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Resources and Additional Information 
Disclaimer: All the knowledge shared about the Vector Autoregression is self-taught using 
the Applied Econometric Time Series (4th Edition) book by Walter Enders (2011), several 
journal articles, and some really helpful videos by Ben Lambert.    
DGP: Vector Autoregression – Pre-estimation Steps 
Unit Root Process: Detailed scholarly information about the unit root process can be found 
on Enders (2011) – Chapter 4 (Models with Trend), Unit Roots and Regression Residuals 
(Unit 3). 
For those seeking for a quick intuitive explanation of the Dickey Fuller test for unit root, 
please refer to Lambert (2013) video: “Dickey Fuller Test for Unit Root” 
https://youtu.be/2GxWgIumPTA. 
Optimal Lag Length Tests: Again, detailed information and a discussion of the optimal 
model selction criterion to render parsimonious models is provided by Enders (2011) on page 
69, in the Model Selection Criteria subsection of the chapter, “Sample Autocorrelation of 
Stationary Series”.  
Again, a shorter visual discussion of these methods are discussed in this 11-minute video by 
Lambert (2013): “Evaluating model fit through AIC, DIC, WAIC, and LOO-CV. 
https://youtu.be/xS4jDHQfP2o 
DGP: Vector Autoregression – Post-estimation Steps 
Wald Test: Lambert (2013) provides a short, under 7-minute, introduction to the Wald test 
for those interested in learning more about it. See the video: https://youtu.be/TFKbyXAfr1M 
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